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INTRODUCTION 
Promises in current Conservative government's Common Sense Revolution included, 
more efficient, responsive government, the reform of welfare, a reduction in the size of 
the government and improved service. The current provincial government in Ontario 
has dramatically changed the responsibilities and financial obligations of local 
government in Ontario. They began the process with the 1996 "Who Does What" 
exercise in disentanglement of provincial and municipal functions. The Crombie panel 
made many recommendations to the government about service delivery, cost sharing 
and governance. The government chose to accept only some of these recommendations. 
The final outcome of this disentanglement has been a downloading of service 
management and delivery, to municipal governments, of public health, land ambulance, 
social housing, childcare and most social assistance programs. The only social assistance 
program the provincial government continues to deliver is the Ontario Disability 
Support Program. As well as managing and delivering these programs, municipal 
governments are now obligated to pay for all or part of their social services from their 
local property tax base. The current government has changed the rules. They have 
introduced significant legislative, regulatory and administrative changes since their 
election. 
In keeping their election promise, the present government has initiated dramatic 
reforms to local government and specifically, to the welfare system. Initially, there was a 
21 percent reduction in benefits and more stringent regulations on eligibility. Then 
' came the introduction of social assistance legislation to support the introduction of 
Ontario Works, eliminate the former Family Benefits Act and create the new, Ontario 
Disability Support Act. The new legislation was combined into The Social Assistance 
Reform Act, 1998. This would allow the transfer of formerly provincially administered, 
sole support parents to the municipally administered Ontario Works program and help 
to achieve the reduction in the size of government promise. Harris could divest the 
provincial administration of the Ontario Public Servants now serving sole support 
parents. Ontario Works Regulations would mandate, with few exceptions, participation 
in the new "work for welfare program." Increased fraud initiatives were also 
introduced. Welfare reform will culminate with the completion of The Business 
Transformation Project and the introduction of the new Service Delivery Model for 
social assistance in 2000-2001. 
The decision to download services to municipalities has created many concerns for the 
government. Cost sharing of social services was a hotly contested issued between the 
province and the municipalities. The province had promised that the downloading of 
services would be "revenue neutral." The Crombie panel1 had recommended that the 
province assume full responsibility for social assistance funding. But, it is speculated, in 
the end, the province's desire to control education that made this recommendation 
untenable. In order to gain control of education, the province would have to fund 
education. Originally, it was proposed, the province totally fund education and the 
municipalities be responsible for one half of the costs of social assistance. Because of an 
outcry from municipalities and the Association of Municipalities of Ontario and the 
1 Ontario, "WDW Panel Recommendations, David Crombie Chair, Who Does What Advisory Panel to 
Honourable Al Leach, Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing, December 6,1996. 
funding was reworked. Eventually, the province would fund one half of education; the 
other half would remain on the local tax base. Ultimately, municipalities would have to 
pay for 20 percent of social assistance allowances and benefits and one half of social 
assistance administration costs. Notwithstanding these concerns around funding and 
revenue neutrality in the transfer of services, was the important issue of who would 
manage and deliver the devolved services. This paper will focus on the peculiar 
organizational differences in managing and delivering the devolved services while 
trying to achieve the provincial government's goal in Northern Ontario, particularly in 
the District of Cochrane. 
Were there organizations with the capacity to effectively deliver these complex, newly 
devolved services? Would the downloading further the provincial goals of not only 
more efficient and effective government, but also less government. How many fewer 
public servants would be required to deliver services, particularly social assistance? 
With how many local governments and agencies would the provincial administration 
have to interact? These are some of the questions. Nobody really knew the answers or 
how complicated the solutions would be. There were more than two hundred and fifty 
municipalities, regions or special purpose bodies delivering welfare alone, more than 
eighty in the North. There were hundreds of childcare service providers with whom the 
province contracted. If you were to add social housing, land ambulance and public 
health providers, the number of local governments or agencies with whom the province 
would have to contract delivery would be staggering. The administrative workforce 
that the province would have to employ would be more likely increase, rather than the 
desired and promised decrease. How was the government going to meet its promise of 
reduction, while providing more efficient, effective, customer-centred government? 
They decided on alternative service delivery. The municipal sector would manage and 
deliver many of the former provincial programs. The province would draw on several 
theories to solve their problem. They would embrace consolidation, indicating the 
traditional consolidationist reasoning of efficiency and equity, but their underlying 
reasoning would be based on new public management theorem. 
New public management is theoretically driven by successful business practices.2 New 
public management theorists believe in the advantages of a larger organization's 
professional management capability.3 These theorists extol that only by utilizing 
technical and technological expertise, Total Quality Management, employee 
empowerment, teamwork and normative management techniques can effective 
functional capacity be developed in organizations.4 The province required 
organizations with the capacity to be effective in the delivery of a wide variety of 
downloaded services. The Harris government would employ new public management 
theory in justifying its divestiture of responsibilities. New public management theorists 
believe that alternative service delivery is the most efficient and effective way to deliver 
public services.5 The Conservatives embraced this alternative service delivery. Based 
on these theories, a decision was made that approximately 50 Consolidated Municipal 
2 Osbome and Gaebler, Reinventing Government. Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley, 1992, p. 2 
3 Robert Denhart, The Pursuit of Significance: Strategies for Managerial Success in Public Organizations. 
Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth, 1993, p. 1. 
4 Ibid., pp. 1-5. 
5 F. Leslie Seidle, Rethinking the Delivery of Public Services to Citizens. The Institute for Research on 
Public Policy (IRPP), 1995, Montreal), pp. 83-85. 
Service Managers, about 10 in the North,6 would be appropriate for social service 
management and delivery. The province believed this would enable the achievement of 
the objective of downloading services while at the same time reducing their public 
service. 
The problems encountered by the government regarding management and delivery of 
services have been different in Southern and Northern Ontario. In the South, all 
territory falls under some form of local government, be that municipalities, counties or 
regions. Reducing government became, according to consolidationist theory, the 
reduction of multiple levels of government, into a single entity, assumed to achieve 
efficiencies and economies of scale.7 The remaining regional government entities and 
the newly formed single tier governments would become the Consolidated Municipal 
Service Managers, enabling accomplishment of the desired, alternate service delivery of 
downloaded services, while reducing the number of government structures and 
administrations. In fact, in hindsight, it appears that the government felt that there 
were too many local government structures in the South. They embarked on a 
campaign, contrary to their right wing ideology and introduced legislation to force 
amalgamations.8 Amalgamations were touted by Leach, the Minister of Municipal 
6 Ontario, "Consolidation of Municipal Services Management, Consolidation Planning Framework: 
Northern Ontario," Provincial-Municipal Services Realignment, Social and Community Health Services 
Implementation Project, January, 1998, p. 4. 
7 Andrew Sancton, Merger Mania, the assault on local government (Westmount: Price-Patterson, 2000), p. 
14. 
8 Ontario, Statutes, Bill 148, The City of Toronto Act, 1997; Bill 9, Taxpayers Savings Municipal 
Amendment Act (Ottawa-Carleton Region), 1998; Bill 32, Greater Hamilton Area Municipal Restructuring 
Act, 1998 
/s#*v Affairs as being able to produce efficiencies.9 This contradicted both right wing 
ideology and former statements by Harris, that bigger is not necessarily better, and that 
services cost more, rather than less, in bigger communities.10 It has been suggested that 
this amalgamation policy came into being when Conservative polls indicated that the 
government's "ace-in-the hole" was the public's concern over the number of local 
politicians.11 This strategy reflected the government's promise to reduce government. 
There was a problem with this approach in the North. The North does not have 
regional government upon whom the government could download management and 
delivery of services. The North consists of a vast geographical area with incorporated 
cities, towns, townships and unincorporated territories with no municipal governance. 
^^ Amalgamation of existing local municipal government, as had taken place in Southern 
Ontario, would also be impossible because of the geographical considerations. Due to 
the lack of municipal governance in the unincorporated areas of the North, the 
provincial offices of the Ministry of Community and Social Services delivered general 
welfare assistance to these unorganized areas. This was not too problematic when the 
legislation mandated only financial assistance to those in need, but became problematic 
once the decision had been made to devolve many services. The Social Assistance 
Reform Act and the new Ontario Works Legislation obligated delivery agents to provide 
employed related services, including community placements, employment support 
services and employment placement services to all clients who had mandatory 
9 Ontario, Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, "A Guide to Municipal Restructuring", (Toronto, 
The Ministry, 1996), Minister's Note as cited in Jerry Richmond, "The Municipal Restructuring Process in 
Ontario", Backgrounder 14, February 1998, updated July 1999, p. 3. 
10 John Barber, "Harris' words come back to bite him," The Globe and Mail. February 19, 1997. 
obligations under the Ontario Works Act. Once the decision to devolve services had 
been made, a pressing dilemma became evident. Who would deliver Ontario Works, 
childcare, social housing, land ambulance and public health in the North, including 
unincorporated territories? Presently, it was a mixture of municipal governments, 
special purpose bodies and the provincial government who delivered these services in 
the North. The option of contracting out of these services to the existing delivery agents 
in the district would not achieve their envisioned integrated service delivery. They 
would be dealing with hundreds of agencies instead of the desired ten. There are ten 
Districts in Northern Ontario. The government would require one organization in each 
District to deliver this wide array of services. In order to achieve their desire number of 
consolidated municipal service managers in the North, the provincial government 
would use new public management theories. 
The introduction of legislation to enable the formation of Area Service Boards or District 
Social Service Administration Boards in Northern Ontario contradicted Harris' 
consolidationist approach to municipal governance in the rest of Ontario. He was 
adopting a regionalist approach for the management and delivery of these municipal 
government functions. He was creating new special purpose bodies and new larger 
administrations. This was totally contrary to the movement away from regional 
governance in Southern Ontario. However, this appeared the only way to solve the 
peculiar problems that emerged in Northern Ontario from the changes occurring in the 
Province. 
11 G. P. Murray Research Limited, "At the Cutting Edge: Tidying Up?" Inside Queen's Park, Vol. 12, No. 
22, December 15, 1999, reprinted with permission in AMCTO Express, December 21, 1999,p. 1. 
In the North, the provincial reasoning behind this contrary approach was the 
requirement to create organizations that were bigger and had more service management 
and delivery capabilities. These organizations, according the new public management 
theory, would be able to deliver the downloaded of services. There was a disconnect 
between what the government was saying and what it was proposing to do in the 
North. As early as 1996, in a Guide to Municipal Restructuring, Al Leach indicated the 
province's intent to honour taxpayer's desires for a smaller, more efficient public sector 
and fewer levels of government."12 He was promising efficiency; even though there is 
no empirical evidence that having larger municipal governments save money.13 To the 
contrary, even according to Harris, they cost more.14 
In this paper, one objective is to discover the most important reasons, both short and 
long-term surrounding the government's decision to create District Social Service 
Administration Boards (DSSABs). The paper will be a case study of the formation of the 
District of Cochrane Social Services Administration Board (CDSSAB). It will contain an 
analysis of why the government felt it was necessary to override local objections to the 
formation of the board. Once the reasoning has been established, a second objective will 
be to examine, during the first year of existence, whether the CDSSAB has met the short-
12 Ontario, Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, "A Guide to Municipal Restructuring," 1996, 
Richmond, Jerry, Research Officer, Backgrounder 14 (Revised), "The Municipal Restructuring Process in 
Ontario," February 1998, updated July 1999, Ontario Legislative Library, Legislative Research Service, 
available at http://www.ontla.on.ca/librarv/B14tx.htm. accessed July 19, 2000. 
13 Andrew Sancton, Merger Mania, the assault on local government (Westmount: Price-Patterson, 2000), p. 
^ 67 and Andrew Sancton, "Reducing costs by consolidating municipalities: New Brunswick, Nova Scotia 
' and Ontario" in Canadian Public Administration. Volume 39, no. 3 (Fall) p. 268. 
14 John Barber, "Harris' words come back to bite him," The Globe and Mail. February 19, 1997. 
■ 
term objectives of the province. It will also discuss whether the CDSSAB has the 
organizational capacity to achieve the province's long-term objectives. 
Harris, in the Common Sense Revolution had promised efficient, effective, less 
government that would be more responsive and more business-like. Less government 
could mean several things. To the Harris government, it meant amalgamations in the 
South, in the North, it meant divesting some current responsibilities with new public 
management theories on alternate methods of service delivery and reducing the size of 
the troublesome, expensive public service. Harris was committed to reducing the 
number of local government administrations, with which the provincial administration 
must interact, furthering his goal of reducing the public service bureaucracy. Harris 
also had a commitment to welfare reform. The planned welfare reform also impacted 
decision-making, requiring larger scale, and technologically proficient organizations to 
enable delivery. 
The Alternative Service Delivery initiative of the present government embraces both 
new public management and organizational management and behavior theories.15 
These theories indicate that the most efficient and effective organizations are those who 
are professionally managed, functionally expert, technologically advanced and have 
empowered, customer-service oriented staff. 
15 Ray McLellan, "Alternative Service Delivery in Ontario: The New Public Management", Ontario 
Legislative Library, January 1997 accessed at http:/www.onUa.on.ca/library/fiiotel l.btm, p. 1. 
10 
The government would, in the North, utilize new public management theories in order 
to accomplish their goals, to devolve provincial government services to municipal 
management and delivery and thereby reduce the size of their public service. 
The author cannot purport to determine whether the consolidation has been successful 
in meeting all goals, both of the province and the municipalities concerned. That is far 
beyond the scope of the paper. These issues are of considerable interest to the 
researcher, the province and the municipalities. The length of the paper does not allow 
for a full evaluation of all-important issues surrounding formation of the CDSSAB. For 
that reason, the following important questions, which the researcher found exceedingly 
difficult to ignore, will not be addressed in detail in this paper: 
• Has efficiency and cost containment, as desired by both the province and the 
municipalities been attained? 
• Has weighted assessment apportionment created allocative inefficiencies (are some 
municipalities now paying for services they either do not receive or do not want)? 
• Has equity in both services and apportionment of costs been created for 
municipalities? 
• Has the promised Local Services Realignment funding maintained the revenue 
neutrality promised, for the region, for each municipality? 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
It is the author's contention that the main reasons behind the formation of the District of 
Cochrane Social Services Administration Board (CDSSAB) were based, in the long-term, 
11 
i#"v on consolidationist claims of efficiency and the achievement of economies of scale. The 
short-term objectives however, were organizational effectiveness and capacity, based on 
new public management theorem of organizational effectiveness and capacity for 
alternate delivery of public services. This literature review will examine 
consolidationist and new public management theorem to determine the province's main 
objectives in the creation of District Social Service Administration Boards in the North. 
In order to achieve the devolution of services, an organization was required which 
would have the ability to deliver the vast array of downloaded services. During a 
personal interview with Germain Lacoursiere, Regional Director, Ministry of 
Community and Social Services, the initial importance, to the government, of a strong 
^^ organization with capacity to deliver the five major devolved services and maintain 
good customer service was stressed.16 The province needed a sophisticated 
organization, with expertise in management, functional service areas and technology to 
deliver integrated community and social services. Many northern communities, 
including the District of Cochrane, did not have these structures in place. Achievement 
of the long-term goal of efficiency was expected with the future reduction of boards and 
related administrations.17 Another provincial commitment, welfare reform, produced 
the Business Transformation Project. The implementation, scheduled for 2000-2001, of 
the new Service Delivery Model for social assistance, necessitated a technologically 
proficient, customer service focused organization. 
16 Personal interview conducted July 10,2000. Interview questions attached as Appendix A. 
17 Ibid. 
12 
The debate rages on in regard to the "correct" or most efficient and effective form of 
governance and the most efficient area and organization to deliver municipal services. 
Differing points of view are abundant in the literature. Why would the Harris 
conservatives, with their right wing ideology, propose a consolidationist solution for the 
delivery of services in Southern Ontario and a regional consolidation solution in the 
North? Why would he, after having publicly admitted that no cost savings were 
apparent from consolidations, continue down this path? None of the empirical 
literature points to savings created by consolidations.18 John Barber quotes Mike Harris, 
true to his right wing ideology, "I disagree with restructuring because it believes that 
bigger is better. Services always cost more in larger communities. The issue is to find 
out how to distribute services fairly and equally without duplicating services."19 
Less government does not necessarily mean fewer and bigger governments. 
Nonetheless, the desire to reduce the number of local governments and politicians, 
along with a desire to take over the education system are indicated in literature as part 
of the reasoning behind the consolidations. In a Guide to Municipal Restructuring (1996), 
Al Leach, the then Minister of Municipal Affairs states ".. .Taxpayers want a smaller 
more efficient public sector, and fewer levels of government."20 The priority was 
"downsizing public government."21 Graham Todd, a political economist, also describes 
18 Andrew Sancton, Merger Mania, the assault on local government (Westmount: Price-Patterson, 2000), p. 
67 and Andrew Sancton, "Reducing costs by consolidating municipalities: New Brunswick, Nova Scotia 
and Ontario" in Canadian Public Administration. Volume 39, no. 3 (Fall) p. 268. 
19 John Barber, "Harris' words come back to bite him," The Globe and Mail. February 19, 1997. 
20 Ontario, Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, "A Guide to Municipal Restructuring", (Toronto, 
The Ministry, 1996), Minister's Note as cited in Jerry Richmond, "The Municipal Restructuring Process in 
Ontario", Backgrounder 14, February 1998, updated July 1999, p. 3. 
21 Jerry Richmond, "The Municipal Restructuring Process in Ontario", Backgrounder 14, February 1998, 
updated July 1999, p. 3. 
13 
the changes as based on the priority of "downsizing public government"22 
Downloading of services to the municipalities would also cull as members of the 
troublesome, powerful Ontario Public Sector Union, while stripping them of successor 
rights with the introducing of Bill 136, The Public Sector Transition Stability Act, 1997. 
Reducing the number of school boards would gain control of education. Forcing 
consolidations and amalgamations would eliminate some of the province's most vocal 
detractors, local politicians.23 The Fewer Municipal Politicians Act was now on the 
political agenda. 
Many of these consolidation decisions seemed to fly in the face of right wing ideology. 
Although previously acknowledged by Harris that amalgamations do not save money, 
but in fact, cost more, the plans for voluntary restructuring, Bill 26, The Savings and 
Restructuring Act, of January 1996 were touted by Leach as a way of reducing the cost 
of local government.24 
Taking over education was another important reason for decision making. Education 
was a prime candidate for provincial control. The province wanted to control what it 
believed was a failing, overly expensive education system. There were five executive 
council members who had been personally involved in the education system in 
Ontario25 and wanted dearly to control and reform the system.26 
22 Graham Todd, "Megacity: Globalization and Governance in Toronto, "Studies in Political Economy, 
Summer 1998, p. 1 Internet site at http://www.vouku.ca/facultv/academic/gtodd/Pepers/new toronto.html 
accessed on May 19, 1999. 
23 G. P. Murray Research Limited, "At the Cutting Edge: Tidying Up?" Inside Queen's Park, Vol. 12, No. 
22, December 15, 1999, reprinted with permission in AMCTO Express, December 21, 1999, p. 1. 
24 Ontario, Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, "A Guide to Municipal Restructuring", (Toronto, 
The Ministry, 1996), Minister's Note as cited in Jerry Richmond, "The Municipal Restructuring Process in 
Ontario", Backgrounder 14, February 1998, updated July 1999, p. 3. 
25 John Ibbitson, Promised Land: Inside the Mike Harris Revolution. Toronto, Prentice-Hall, 1997, p. 222. 
14 
Consolidationist literature expounding the benefits of "economies of scale" also exhorts 
the possibility of the provision of professional management. The amalgamation mind 
set proposes the advantages of larger organization having more ability to specialize and 
more qualified staff to enable the provision of professional management. 
Consolidationists hold the view that an organization must be of considerable size and 
covering a territory containing a sufficient number of people in order to benefit from the 
aforementioned economies of scale.27 
The funding of education and social assistance also helped determine decision-making. 
Crombie, in the October 1996 "Who Does What" Report recommends that the provision 
-^ of income redistributive program should be fully funded by the government most able 
to access the broad income tax base to redistribute income to those in need.28 This is a 
universally held belief, as the local base, which is property based, cannot afford, 
especially during bad economic times, to fulfill the commitment of income 
redistribution. The provincial government, however, did not accept that 
recommendation,29 and originally suggested that local tax base absorb one half of the 
cost of social assistance, in exchange for education costs. When all advice was to 
remove social assistance costs from the local tax base, it was the desire to have complete 
control over education that left eventually, 20 percent of allowance and benefit costs and 
26 For a more full discussion of this issue see John Ibbilson, Promised Land: Inside the Mike Harris 
Revolution. Toronto, Prentice-Hall, 1997, pp. 221-232. 
27 For a more detailed commentary on consolidationist position see: Andrew Sancton, Merger Mania, the 
assault on local government (Westmount: Price-Patterson, 2000), p. 9 and pp. 25-40. 
28 Ontario, "WDW Panel Recommendations, David Crombie Chair, Who Does What Advisory Panel to 
f^ Honourable Al Leach, Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing, December 6, 1996. 
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50 percent of administration costs on the local tax base. In an article entitled New 
Municipal Roles, John Harrison, Chair of the Regional Municipality of Haldimand-
Northfolk, speculates, 
"In the background, however, the antipathy of this provincial government for the 
education system as it existed up until now was becoming a driving factor in 
government decision-making. The government was committed to capturing 
control of education by taking its cost off the property taxpayer to justify gutting 
the power of the local board of education. No arguments by Crombie or anyone 
else could dissuade them."30 
Today's public, in Ontario, seems more concerned about saving tax dollars than the 
provision of adequate social services to the population of the province. One of the 
Common Sense Revolution's continuing agenda is welfare reform. Decisions would 
also be partially determined around the requirements of reforming the welfare system. 
Within the federal and provincial governments there was a reform agenda on the table 
in regards to social programs, which were considered out of date and needing to be 
restructured. "Key priorities include a coordinated restructuring of unemployment 
insurance, social assistance, training and education in order to equip Canadian for the 
global economy and to promote adjustment in the economy as a whole."31 The deficit 
reduction agenda "puts tremendous pressure on the two biggest categories of program 
spending: transfers to persons and transfers to other levels of government."32 Driven by 
this fiscal agenda, grant transfers are cut drastically and provinces are allowed greater 
flexibility in determining social services and defining social assistance, with the 
29 Bruce DeMara, '"It's absolutely the wrong thing to do' Crombie blasts Tories on Welfare," City Hall 
Bureau, The Toronto Star. (No date available - probably December 1996), p. Al. 
30 John Harrison, "New Municipal Roles", in Municipal World. August 1998, p. 16. 
31 Keith G. Banting, "The social policy review: policy making in a semi-sovereign society," Canadian 
Public Administration. Volume 38, no. 2 (Summer) p. 284. 
32 Ibid., p. 284. 
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/^ consolidation of several grants into the Canada Health and Social Transfer.33 At the 
same time, social policy reform was frustrated by political complications, not being 
integrated into the fiscal policy, involving multiple, varying opinions of cabinet and 
caucus, social policy groups and the federal-provincial relationship. An astute Mark 
Lalonde, the then Minister of Human Resources Development "regularly warned that if 
the social policy community could not agree on a strategy to restructure social policy 
within contemporary constraints, the job would eventually be done by others less 
sensitive to the social needs of Canadians."34 Was he foreseeing the increased 
"Americanized" right wing fiscal conservatism to come? Banting quotes survey data 
from the Financial Post in October 22-24 of 1994 that "pointed to a hardening of 
attitudes among Canadians generally towards unemployment insurance and social 
_^ assistance."35 Ontario had the problem of this increased cost of social assistance and the 
Harris conservatives relished the public's acceptance, no jubilation, for his welfare 
reform initiative. The conservative's workfare and welfare fraud initiatives capture the 
generally held opinions that people who are on welfare will not seek employment 
unless forced and that fraud is abounding in the system. This public opinion helped to 
precipitate the promise to revamp social assistance in Ontario. The revamping included 
reductions in basic benefits for welfare recipients, the introduction of new computer 
technologies including third party on-line checking of participants' assets, income and 
credit rating records. The Business Transformation Project of the Ministry of 
Community and Social Services is an integral, important government initiative. It is a 
M Ibid., p. 286. 
34 Ibid., p. 287. 
35 Ibid., p. 288. 
17 
Common Purpose Procurement agreement with Andersen Consulting to reengineer 
social assistance delivery processes and develop supportive technology. 
The new Service Delivery Model being developed for social assistance, with expected 
implementation to be complete by mid 2001 reengineers processes and technology to 
support the government's stated objectives of more responsive, effective and efficient 
client services. The new model features Interactive Voice Response for clients and one 
regional intake-screening unit, for the entire North, to support two-stage telephone 
intake. The model will redesign business processes and outdated, separate 
computerized systems into a comprehensive web-based technology that supports third 
party information checking. Some of the key messages surrounding the implementation 
are that it will "increase efficiency, ...generate savings, ...eliminate the province's need 
to maintain multiple data basses, prevent double dipping and enable cross program and 
cross-jurisdiction overpayment recovery ...change work processes and require fewer 
staff at both the provincial and municipal levels."36 The province also contends that the 
new model will provide better service for clients, ensure consistent service delivery and 
promote self-reliance through employment. They confirm that this new model cannot 
be introduced until two major government initiatives have occurred, municipal 
consolidation and the transfer of sole support and temporary care cases to 
municipalities.37 
36 Ontario, "Key Messages - Service Delivery Model Basics Update," July 6, 1998, p. 1, Attached to a 
memorandum to all social assistance staff from Assistant Deputy Ministers Costante and Ewart, dated July 
6, 1998. 
37 Ontario, "Qs and As - Service Delivery Model," July 6, 1998, p. 2, Attached to a memorandum to all 
social assistance staff from Assistant Deputy Ministers Costante and Ewart, dated July 6,1998. 
18 
Reengineering is a new public management theory. It is a fundamental rethinking and 
radical redesign of business processes to achieve dramatic improvements in critical 
contemporary measures of performance. In the delivery of social assistance, processes 
were seen to be inadequately designed and inefficient. Similar to Taylorism, 
reengineering breaks down work into finite activities and measures whether there is 
value added or not. The theory indicates that one takes an activity, examines it, and 
determines if it is necessary, and, if it is not value added, one revises, reworks, moves or 
eliminates it The Business Transformation Project's, business process review contains 
measures of cost, quality and speed, improvement in efficiency and effectiveness. It also 
recommends appropriate organizational design, defines performance measures and is 
developing an advance technological solution to complement processes and simplify 
delivery.38 
Osborne and Gaebler, among others, see performance measurement, another new public 
management theory, as strengthening accountability.39 This is especially true when 
combined with benchmarking, using the "best in industry" practices and results as 
goals for every organization to achieve, either as a comparison to a baseline number, to 
engineered standards, to other organizations, to an industry standard or as a 
comparison of organizational achievements over time. Benchmarking cannot be 
accomplished without performance measures. It is a systematic and continuous 
measurement process, designed to produce action to improve performance. The types 
of performance measures include: input measures, output measures, measures of 
38 Business Transformation Project, Service Delivery Model, August 1998. 
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/#w*v efficiency (the ratio of inputs/ outputs) and effectiveness measures, (outcomes), or 
quality measures (are you satisfying customer requirements). The theory is "What gets 
measured, gets done."40 In Reinventing Government, the efficacy of not only 
measuring, but also publishing the performance measure results, the percentage 
number of errors in granting welfare in Massachusetts in 1979, was highlighted. The 
error rate was 23 percent, 
"When we began measuring error rates statewide, nothing happened. Bas as 
soon as we published the rates for each office, things changed. Because now the 
finger was pointed at managers: everyone knew if their office had a high rate. It 
only took 12 months to cut it down to 12 percent Six months later, when we 
published error rates for each supervisor, it fell to 8 percent."41 
The current government is beginning to base funding on performance measures and 
have recently released Ontario Works Community Placement results, and provided 
bonus funding for all delivery agents who have exceeded provincial expectations.42 
They have formed a Community Placement Secretariat to support enhance performance 
management and encourage best practices among delivery agents. 
Implementation of the new Service Delivery Model and the institution of performance 
related funding is only possible in cohesive, technologically advanced organizations. 
The province's vision of a welfare system supporting clients towards the "shortest route 
to employment" needs organizational capacity to deliver. The capacity to offer a wide 
variety of services, with expertise in employment planning, is essential. The revamping 
of welfare necessitated the formation of larger organizations, in the North, that had the 
39 David Osbome and Ted Gaebler, Reinventing Government. Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley, 1992, p. 
146 
40 Ibid., p. 146 
^ « Ibid., p. 146. 
f Ontario, Ministry of Community and Social Services, Ontario Works Bulletin, "Implementation of 
Increased Funding for Community Placement Targets", January 20,2000, pp. 1-6. 
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/"""* capacity to set and manage performance targets and to operate and maintain the 
sophisticated computer operations needed to properly implement these initiatives. 
The new public management proponents advocate, as the consolidationist had, for 
more professional management in government, but for differing reasons. The 
consolidationist had wanted to avoid patronage; new public management emphasizes 
the business driven agenda.43 The Harris conservatives embraced the new public 
management genre by introducing an Alternative Services Delivery initiative. "Ontario 
has embarked on a New Public Management initiative referred to as Alternative Service 
Delivery."44 New Public Management places "a greater emphasis on performance, an 
increased focus on responsiveness to citizens and accountability for results."45 
^^ Expenditure restraint and alternative service delivery, including public-private 
partnerships and contracting out of public services to the private sector are high the 
Harris agenda. Ontario Works legislation, however, does not permit, the delivery of 
Ontario Works, by other than designated municipal service managers. Even the Harris 
government could not envision the delivery of social services by for-profit companies 
being accepted by the voters. While the public enthusiastically supported the workfare 
and fraud initiatives, Ontarians would draw the line at a corporation making profit 
obviously on the backs of the underprivileged. This was demonstrated by the public 
outcry when tax dollars were being spent on the expensive private sector expertise in 
the Common Purpose Procurement agreement with Anderson Consulting. 
43 David Osbome and Ted Gaebler, Reinventing Government. Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley, 1992, p 
146. 
44 Ray McLellan, "Alternative Service Delivery in Ontario: The New Public Management", Ontario 
Legislative Library, January 1997 accessed at http:/www.ontla.on.ca/library/motel l.htm, p. 1. (1-3) 
45 Ibid., p. 1. 
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/^ An organization's ability to adapt to change and manage in a complex environment is a 
cornerstone of new public management theory.46 In the social services' world, since the 
first election of the present government in 1995, there has been one change after another. 
The only thing that remains constant is change. Legislative changes, regulatory 
changes, technological changes, changes in directives, and finally changes in 
organizations that deliver social services have occurred. The changes are not complete. 
There is still devolution of future services and the introduction of the new Service 
Delivery Model for Ontario Works, new regulations, new technology and intake 
screening units, call centres for initial application for social assistance. 
Proponents of new public management, indicate that utilizing theories such as; Total 
-^ Quality Management, organizational capacity for strategic management, empowerment, 
flexibility, re-engineering, an emphasis on service orientation and normative style 
management, enable the "new organization" to adapt and provide efficient, effective, 
customer-friendly service, a promise of the current government. 
"Many people are now proclaiming a 'revolution' in management thinking, a 
revolution that is making possible new gains in quality and productivity in both 
the public and private sectors. Rather than seeking uniformity and control, 
managers are talking about adaptability, creativity, and shared power. Rather 
than depending on traditional hierarchical forms of organization, managers are 
experimenting with flatter structures and more participatory ways of organizing. 
Rather than focusing on the internal workings of the organization, managers are 
becoming more sensitive to their clients or 'customers' and more attentive to their 
relations with those in other organizations. And the results are impressive."47 
An organization must make a huge commitment to training when embracing 
empowerment, teamwork and normative management styles. It must understand and 
46 Robert Denhart, The Pursuit of Significance: Strategies for Managerial Success in Public Organizations. 
Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth, 1993, p. 1. 
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/f*^ embrace the concepts and commitment required. Kernahan points to these necessities if 
an effective organization is desired, "intensive development of skills for the team as a 
whole and for individual members to help them in understanding and managing 
change, improving interpersonal communications and enabling group problem-solving 
and decision-making and team-based performance management."48 
New public management literature also stresses the need for strategic planning. This 
includes establishing a clear vision and mission.49 It implores leaders to identify the 
changes needed in their organization to ensure success. "Business leaders have to be 
able to view patterns as if they were on a balcony"50 see the organization for what it is, 
identify the good and bad, identify the adaptive challenge. This takes time and effort. 
Once adaptive change has been identified, the organization must move forward with 
focus and discipline, mindful and empathetic of the distress, which change causes.51 
Organizations must learn new ways of doing business, develop new competencies and 
learn to work collectively. The question is posed, "Whose values, belief, attitudes or 
behaviors would have to change in order for progress to take place."52 When describing 
an organization attempting to both transform to a customer oriented, team work 
centered organization and identify the adaptive challenge, it was recognized that "more 
than anything else changes in values, practices, and relationships throughout the 
47 Ibid., p. 1. 
48 Kenneth Kemaghan, "Empowerment and Public Administration: Revolutionary advance or passing 
fancy?" Canadian Public Administration. 35 (2), Summer 1992, p. 203. 
49 Hal G. Rainey, Understanding & Managing Public Organizations. Second Edition, Jossey-
Bass Inc, San Francisco, Ca, 1997, p. 358. 
so Ronald A. Heifetz and Donald L. Laurie, "The Work of Leadership," Harvard Business Review. January 
-February, 1997, p. 125. 
51 Ibid., pp. 126-7. 
52 Ibid., p. 126. 
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company"53 would be the most essential component. In literature on normative 
management, the leader of the organization creates an environment where all 
employees share the achievement culture and values of an organization. This approach 
also places "strong emphasis on training and development"54 of employees. Bennis and 
Nanus explain, "Managers have to provide vision and manage symbols in ways that 
lead employees to understand the goals of the organization and to be inspired by 
This preceding new public management theory is embodied in the government's 
decision to move to alternative service delivery. The province needed delivery agents in 
the North with these organizational qualities, if they were to achieve their objectives of 
effective, customer-centred government. 
With change and complexity becoming commonplace, Denhart feels that public 
managers must shift their focus from "giving orders" and maintaining control to 
becoming more creative, innovative, promoting dialogue and innovation" and building 
effective relationships "within and with outside organizations as critical to their 
success.56 Denhart believes that today's public organizations, beleaguered by budget 
cuts while being expected to "do more than less" and maintain a high level of customer 
5J Ibid., p. 126. 
54 Edward Lawler III, "Creating the High-Involvement Organization," in Jay Galbraith, Edward Lawler III, 
et al, Organizing for the Future. San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1993, p. 188. 
jkv 5S Bennis and Nanus, as cited in Ibid., p. 187. 
t M Robert Denhart, The Pursuit of Significance: Strategies for Managerial Success in Public Organizations. 
Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth, 1993, p. 2. 
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service, it is those organizations transformed and initiated "comprehensive efforts to 
improve quality and productivity"57 who will succeed. 
Denhart believes that some of the present day managerial transplantation of business 
concepts into the public sector has been positive, and states that public sector managers 
have "become more attentive to planning, more results-oriented, and more attuned to 
cost-effectiveness."58 He however points out the downfall of trying to implement 
business only driven agendas in public organizations, that the circumstances and core 
values of government different than those of business. Human services should not be 
delivered with solely a business agenda. The public has a right to expect that values be 
a consideration in the delivery of these services. 
"The point is not that efficiency is unimportant: indeed, there is no question but that 
efficiency is extremely important in government. The point is that efficiency is not the 
single nor even necessarily the most important criterion for evaluating the work of 
public agencies."59 A study by Otto Brodtrick, Office of the Auditor General in Canada, 
focused on high performance government organizations and analyzed the management 
philosophy and practice that resulted in their success. The study concludes that the 
following were some of the criteria of success: "an emphasis on people, participative 
leadership, innovative work styles, a strong client orientation and, most important a 
mindset that seeks optimum performance."60 Brodtrick is quoted as indicating that in 
these organizations, people "hold values that drive them to always seek improvement in 
their organization's performance. When conditions change, they adjust their methods 
57 Ibid., p. 3. 
58 Ibid., pp. 9-10. 
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not their values. Because of this orientation toward performance and adaptability, the 
organization performs well even in a changing environment. This mindset may be the 
most important attribute of all."61 
The crystallization of these business-driven agendas has abounded since the 1980s. The 
federal conservatives introduced, "Public Service 2000", Mulroney's desire for 
"Canadian government to be 'leaner and meaner/" British Prime Minister Thatcher's 
Financial Management Initiative defined a government agency or department as an 
organization. In that organization managers have, "a clear view of their objectives and 
means to assess, and wherever possible, measure outputs or performance in relation to 
those objectives [and] well-defined responsibility for making the best use of their 
resource including a critical scrutiny of output and value for money."62 
Denharf s critique of managerialism in public administration summarizes the 
restrictions on wholeheartedly adopting business-like managerialism. He stresses 
opinions of Waldo and Dimock suggesting that scientific management and efficiency 
are not the only criteria on which to judge the performance of government 
organizations. These organizations exist in highly charged political environment, in 
which administrators are involved in policy decisions and discretion in the execution of 
the policies.63 There is the need to embrace the values of service to the broader "public". 
According to Hugh Faulkner, Secretary General of the International Chamber of 
59 Ibid, p. 12. 
60 Ibid., p. 5. 
ysfjwv 6I Otto Brodtrick, as cited in Ibid., p. 5. 
f 62 Quote from Financial Management Initiative, as cited in Ibid., p. 10. 
63 Ibid., p. 14. 
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Commerce, contemporary public institutions are "far too process-driven... governed by 
rules ... too hierarchical... far too prone to built-in control mechanisms ... (which) limit 
the freedom of action... the capacity to respond and limit initiative The capacity for 
government to respond to change will in large measure depend on its ability to adapt 
institutionally, to build in more flexibility and responsiveness and to introduce what I 
describe as managerial adaptiveness."64 
It was the neutral, bureaucratic provincial delivery system that the government wanted 
to scrap. Alternate service delivery and devolution of services to the more responsive 
municipal arena could accomplish their goal. The conservative's commitment to 
alternate service delivery could be read as, reduce the number of provincial public 
servants by downloading responsibilities for management and delivery of programs to 
municipalities, who have generally lower salaries, and in the view of the public deliver 
more effective, customer centered service. In the North, Harris needed organizations 
with the capacity to deliver these services. 
Downloading services to municipalities to achieve these goals is legitimized by current 
theory on the public impressions of service satisfaction. A1992 Canadian national 
survey65 ranked impression of service provided by public and private sector 
organization in Canada. The results indicated that except for insurance companies, the 
three levels of government were at the bottom of the ranking.66 The municipal civil 
64 Ibid., p. 13. 
65 Insight Canada Research, Perspectives Canada. Vol. 1, no. 4 (Fall 1992), p. 36 as cited in F. Leslie 
Seidle, Rethinking the Delivery of Public Services to Citizens. The Institute for Research on Public Policy 
(IRPP), Montreal, 1995, p. 12 and p. 77. 
66 Ibid., p. 12. 
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service ranked higher than the other levels of government.67 All levels of government in 
Canada ranked lower in citizen satisfaction than other countries.68 Although 
acknowledging that the reasons for this are complex, David Zussman has identified one 
possible reason: "that the value structure of Canadians contains an element of anti-
government and anti-public service thinking despite our heavy reliance on government 
as an instrument of societal change."69 Seidle also indicates that other reasoning for 
improving service delivery is that an emphasis on service has moved organizations to 
adopt performance measure that in turn can help achieve efficiencies and that 
improvements in service can also reduce the cost of errors.70 Seidle, although 
acknowledging that certain especially disadvantaged groups of citizens may still require 
personal service; sites innovations such as "single window delivery" coupled with 
information technology simplify interaction with government services and lead to 
savings.71 Seidle states, 
"A review of recent academic literature and reform initiatives in a number of 
jurisdictions suggests three main routes to improved delivery of public services: 
quality management, structural change to separate policy and operational 
functions (notably the devolution of service delivery to agencies) and what I shall 
refer to as performance-oriented measures."72 
Paul O'Neill, a former deputy director of the U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 
describes an alternate approach to new public management organizations in which, 
managers needed to develop organizations that were adaptive, responsive and well 
focused placing a premium on high performance while sharing power and taking risks. 
67 Ibid., p. 12. 
68 Ibid., p. 12. 
69 David Zuzzman, "Government service to the public," p. 19 as cited in Ibid., p. 12. 
70 Ibid., p. 13. 
71 Ibid., o. 13. 
iD a., is 
p  
72 Ibid., p. 13 
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/"*•* He describes the "brightest and best" of ideas of new public managers today are a 
commitment to value and dedication to public service, giving priority to serving the 
public, embracing empowerment and shared leadership, accepting change as natural, 
embracing the opportunities change provides, and employing a creative and humane 
approach to changes.73 
In Denhart's critique of some the managerialism prospective, he criticizes Herbert 
Simon's proponent of efficiency, with no concerns around other criteria on which public 
organizations are judged, such as, "liberty, justice equity, equality, responsiveness."74 
Proponents of some of the theories of new public management include Denning's Total 
Quality Management, ensuring that organizations are managed effectively, with the 
^^ organizational structure in place to enable quick response to change, and provide 
effective, efficient delivery of services. 
In the Government of Ontario - Business Plan 2000-2001, Ministry of Community and 
Social Services, the Ministry vision statement although stating that an affordable system 
is a priority, stresses the emphasis on effectiveness, accountability and integrated client-
focused services 
"An affordable and effective system of community and social services that 
supports and invest in: 
• Families and communities, to encourage responsibility and accountability; 
• Adults, so they can live as independently as possible; 
• A services system in which children are safe and people most in need receive 
support. 
73 Robert Denhart, The Pursuit of Significance: Strategies for Managerial Success in Public Organizations. 
Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth, 1993, p. 12. 
74 Ibid., p. 12. 
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/0*^ We will be guided by the principles of shared responsibility, accountability and 
' fairness, as we deliver integrated and client-focused service."75 
The plan reiterates the goal of ensuring effective and accountable services and the intent 
not to tolerate welfare fraud. In a speech in late 1999, Celia Denov, Team Lead, 
Provincial-Municipal Services Realignment, Social and Community Health Services 
Implementation Project, Ministry of Community and Social Services indicates the 
following government goals. "Providing efficient, effective service delivery to 
individuals and families through sound business practices, improved policy capacity 
and effective service system management." 76 
In the new alternative service delivery initiative, the integration of human services has 
risen to the forefront. "Integration of human services is an extremely important subject, 
from the perspective of the Provincial government."77 Defining municipal challenges, in 
remarks to the Fall Training Seminar of the Ontario Municipal Social Services 
Association on Monday, Nov. 30,1998, Suzanne Herbert, then Deputy Minister, 
Ministry of Community and Social Services, illustrate the challenges ahead for 
municipal service deliverers. These included assessing organization capacity to carry 
out human services planning; managing change within the organization and building 
internal systems needed to integrate human services.78 
75 Ontario, Ministry of Community and Social Services, "Business Plans 2000-2001," p. 2. Internet site 
http://www.gov.on.ca/MBS/english/press/plans2000/css.html accessed on June 26,2000 
76 Ibid., p. 7. 
77 Celia Denov, "Integrating Human Services: Challenges, Successes and New Ideas," Speech at the 1999 
Annual Conference of the Northern Ontario Service Deliverers, Sudbury, Ontario, October 7,1999. 
78 Herbert, Suzanne, "Check Against Delivery," Remarks to the Fall Training Seminar of the Ontario 
Municipal Social Services Association, Toronto, November 20,1998, p. 9. 
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Since integration of human services had become a priority, ensuring that organizations 
were in place to enable them to deliver these integrated services was essential. In 
addressing the need for integrated services, a report, Integration of Human Services, 
Volume I, describes integration as a provincial goal. "The Province has strengthened its 
own capacity to foster integration of services at the local level through structural 
changes and through policy and legislation."79 After the decision to download services, 
and once the 47 Consolidated Municipal Service Managers were in place, the desire for 
integrated, customer service centered delivery of human services, at the local 
government level, became an evident goal of the provincial government 
"Service integration is a concept that is currently enjoying a major revival. 
Current social policy directions (especially on the part of the Ontario 
government) reflect a renewed will to implement integrated service delivery 
models in human service programs and organizations."80 
The objectives stated for integration were to "improve service quality and increase 
efficiency."81 The magnetic benefits claimed which will be resolved by integrating 
health and social services have been many, including claims of, reduction in gaps in 
service, duplication of services and fragmentation. Although creating an intuitive 
appeal to fiscally concerned governments, these have not been studied sufficiently to 
warrant these claims.82 With the integration "push" on, it would be more important 
than ever that the Consolidated Municipal Service Manager (CMSM) had the 
organizational capacity to deliver the downloaded programs. A reference to "building 
79 Ontario, Human Services Integration. Volume I - CMSM Survey. Queen's Printer for Ontario, 2000, p. 
4. 
80 Daniel P. Salhani and others, "Issues in the Measurement of Integrated Service Delivery in Human 
Services, The Canadian Journal of Program Evaluation. Vol. 9 No 1,1994, p. 1 
81 Ontario, Human Services Integration. Volume I - CMSM Survey. Queen's Printer for Ontario, 2000, p. 
i. 
82 Daniel P. Salhani and others, "Issues in the Measurement of Integrated Service Delivery in Human 
Services, The Canadian Journal of Program Evaluation. Vol. 9 No 1, 1994, p. 2. 
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capacity,"83 and an admission, the first discovered, that, at least in the short-term, the 
addition of sole support parent caseload to the Ontario Works caseload, with intense 
employment support activities required, will mean a cost increase to both the province 
and the municipalities84, emerges in Key Messages for Municipalities contained with 
memo from Kevin Costante, Assistant Deputy Minister, Social Assistance Employment 
Opportunity. 
A study carried out by the Ministry of Community and Social Services, in 1999, dealt 
with human service integration in CMSMs. The survey was aimed at supporting 
integration by examining best practices. The following are the key success factors for 
integration; strong leadership, shared vision, communication, cross training, and a focus 
on client and system outcomes.85 Additional success factors identified in the document 
were; allocation of resources, accountability structures, evaluation of integration results, 
and facilitative conditions.86 Other success factors, identified by CMSMs, included; 
organizational culture, stakeholder relationship, political will, policies and procedures, 
timeframes, and flexibility.87 
The focus of welfare has changed from just handing out cheques to ensuring people 
collecting social assistance do something for their money. Whether it be training or 
83 Costante, Kevin, Memo to Social Service Administrators, subject Social Assistance Transformation 
Update, December 18, 1997, p. 2. 
84 Ibid., p. 3. 
85 Ontario, Human Services Integration. Volume I — CMSM Survey. Queen's Printer for Ontario, 2000, pp. 
42-44. 
86 Ibid., pp. 45-46. 
87 Ibid., pp. 47-50. 
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>#»n community placement, the passive system "money for nothing"88 in Ontario has been 
transformed to an active system requiring that "all able-bodied recipients work, learn 
or train in return for their benefits,"89 with a high emphasis on electronic third party 
checking to ensure that only those entitled to benefits receive them. This requires the 
technological capacity. Mike Harris promises that with the reduction in cases, 
envisioned by the fraud initiative, that there be a reinvestment of money saved, 
advanced training for caseworkers to assist them in their new employment focus of 
putting people back to work.90 
Harris' assertions include, 
"Government should be run more like a good business putting the needs of the 
customer first" and "one stop shopping" and "{we will) work to get ...municipal 
governments to join us in this program"91 
The present government has indicated, "as it reduces costs ... {it} will move to reduce 
internal duplication, offer one-stop access to services and improve delivery."92 
The Harris government indicates its devolution reasoning is an improvement in 
customer service. Glenna Carr, formerly with the Management Board, a strong 
advocate of customer service is quoted "the present government attaches a much 
higher priority to fiscal restraint:... Harris is also committed to a significant reduction 
in the size of the public service."93. In his commentary on Carr's observation, Seidle 
believes that there is implicitly a suggestion that these restructuring and spending 
88 Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario, "Blueprint - Mike Harris' Plan to Keep Ontario on the Right 
Track" April 1999 p. 16. 
89 Ibid., p. 16. 
90 Ibid, p. 16. ,  
91 Ibid., p. 20. 
92 "Speech from the Throne on the opening of the First Session of the Thirty-Sixth Parliament of the 
Province of Ontario," September 27, 1995, p. 11, as cited in F. Leslie Seidle, Rethinking the Delivery of 
Public Services to Citizens. The Institute for Research on Public Policy (IRPP, 1995, Montreal), p. 109. 
93 Ibid, p. 109. 
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reduction initiatives may provide opportunities for improving public service delivery.94 
Harris is described as sharing this view by stating expectations to deputy ministers, 
shortly after his election, "to energetically pursue the potential for new models for 
delivering services, including the creation of special operating agencies, privatization 
and joint ventures."95 
The research has lead the author to believe long term efficiency is a desired, albeit 
possibly, theoretically untenable goal, of the province. Their most important goal was 
to force the formation of organizations with the capacity to deliver effective, result and 
accountability oriented, integrated services over vast geographical area in Northern 
Ontario. This could only be accomplished by the formation of an organization that 
would have new public management attributes, skills to adapt to change, technical 
expertise, flexibility and customer-centred delivery. The primary reasoning behind the 
decision to create DSSABs in Northern Ontario has been discovered. Developing 
organizations with the capability to achieve alternate service delivery, including the 
reengineered Ontario Works delivery, in a customer-centred environment was foremost. 
Achieving this primary goal could also achieve the secondary goal of downsizing the 
provincial public sector. 
94 Ibid., p. 109 
34 
HISTORY 
The theoretical stage, around provincial decision-making has now been set. The next 
section will provide: 
• a history of social assistance delivery in Ontario 
• an overview of the services to be devolved 
• an overview of the District of Cochrane and of the organizations that were 
delivering Ontario Works when the province made their decision to download 
services. 
It will examine how the provincial decisions impacted on the formation of the CDSSAB. 
This history will also reinforce that, regardless of local political opinions, the two 
provincial objectives of having organizations with the capacity to deliver services and 
the reduction of the provincial civil service were foremost on the provincial agenda in 
the formation of the CDSSAB. 
Long before the forced consolidation of the CDSSAB, the delivery of an ever 
increasingly complicated social assistance system and funding of social assistance had 
been a controversial issue with both the province and the municipalities. The 
Provincial-Municipal Social Services Review committee, commissioned in 1987, and 
consisting of representatives from MCSS, AMO and the Ontario Municipal Social 
Services Association (OMSSA) concluded that the roles, responsibilities and funding 
95 "Address by Premier Mike Harris to Deputy Ministers," June 27, 1995, mimeo, p. 4, as cited in Ibid., p. 
109 
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/<p»v which were established in the 1960s required a fundamental rethinking as the diverse 
services now required improved planning and co-ordination to best utilize resources 
and function effectively.96 The recommendations97 included: 
• Full provincial responsibility, for policy, funding and management of children's 
services, social assistance and facility-based care for the developmentally disabled 
• Provincial responsibility for policy, municipal responsibility for management and a 
cost sharing of 75% provincial and 25% municipal 
The recommendation for full provincial funding of social assistance was justified in the 
report by the following: 
"It is one of the least appropriate programs to be funded by the property tax 
because costs tend to rise at times when local governments are least able to afford 
an increase. Income support must be available, on an equitable basis, to anyone 
who is eligible across Ontario, and should not depend on the revenue-generating 
capacity of an individual municipality."98 
Municipalities were recommended to complete the planning and delivery of the 
services, recognizing that these functions should be carried out at a local level and 
should contain links with other appropriate local services. These recommendations were 
not adopted, but did set the stage for further discussions on the topic. 
The New Democratic Government of the early 1990s commissioned a study to make 
recommendations on the "disentanglement" of policy and funding roles and 
responsibilities between the province and the municipalities, particularly in the areas of 
social and health services. The Report of the Advisory Committee to the Minister of 
Municipal Affairs on the Provincial-Municipal Financial Relationship, known as the 
96 Ontario, Provincial - Municipal Social Services Review Committee, Report: Provincial Municipal Social 
Services Review. Queen's Printer for Ontario, Toronto, Ontario, 1988. 
W 
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/s**v Hopcroft Report, 1993 recommended also that the province assume the responsibility 
for policy making and funding of all mandatory items for general welfare, childcare and 
public health. The planning, management and service delivery model was to be 
determined by the province, reflected the NDP centralism. Municipalities were happy 
with the recommended provincial assumption of costs but were disturbed by the lack of 
local determination of planning, management and delivery of the system. Further 
discussions were inevitable. 
AMO prepared a policy paper in 1993" recommending one local authority for health 
and social services. Their reasoning behind the recommendation was that one authority 
would be more cost efficient, less duplicitous, facilitates service planning and is a one-
^^ window access to co-ordinated services. Unfortunately, the pragmatic concern with the 
recession and debt reduction tabled these reforms. 
The election of the Progressive Conservatives, in 1995 escalated the fiscal agenda. The 
Common Sense Revolution promised less tax, smaller government and welfare reform. 
The Crombie panel had released recommendations for northern governance in 
December 1996. Their recommendations were to institute some form of modified 
county structure.100 Legislation101 was introduced to allow for voluntary formation of 
this upper-tier level of government, a position contrary to reducing government, but 
99 Association of Municipalities of Ontario, "Municipal Option: Local Authority for Health and Social 
Services." Policy Direction Series. AMO, Toronto, 1993. 
100 Ontario, "WDW Panel Recommendations on Local Governance," David Crombie Chair, Who Does 
What Advisory Panel to Honourable Al Leach, Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing, December 6, 
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necessitated by the requirement of having strong organizations to enable the delivery of 
the multitude of downloaded services to municipalities. During the fall of 1996 a joint 
communique from Janet Ecker, then Minister of Community & Social Services and Chris 
Hodgins, Minister of Northern Development and Mines indicated the direction that the 
government wanted to go with regards to Northern Ontario. They were contemplating 
larger units, formed with local agreement, to deliver a variety of the downloaded 
services to Northern Ontario. The key themes were still less government and 
efficiency.102 The province knew that this would not immediately produce efficiencies, 
but remains convinced that at the end of the process, cost savings would be achieved. 
The province was committed to the devolution of these services and in the end; the 
province dictated both the area covered and the governance model for the CDSSAB. 
Opportunity still exists for municipalities to co-operate in the formation of an Area 
Service Board (ASB), which will allow for a broad range of services to be managed and 
delivered across the District. The following would be the core and optional services103 
that could be delivered by ASBs: 
101 Ontario, Statutes, Bill 174, The Northern Services Improvement Act, 1997 reintroduced as Bill 12, 
Northern Services Improvement Act, 1998. 
102 From a personal interview conducted on July 10,2000 with Germain Lacoursiere, Regional Director, 
MCSS, North Bay office 
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Municipalities and unincorporated areas have until April 1,2002 to submit a proposal 
for an ASB. 
The Harris government was really more interested in the New Public Management 
theory of management professionalism, results orientation and accountability, in order 
to have organizations able to deliver the array of social services that was to be 
downloaded. These services for which responsibility was to be assumed were 
announced during "mega-week", January 1997, including assumption of responsibilities 
for the following services, social assistance, childcare and social housing, as of January 
1998, with land ambulance and public health to be assumed at a later date. 
This assumption of services was part of the broader announcement of the realignment 
of responsibilities between the province and the municipalities.104 Along with 
responsibility for the delivery of these services, municipalities were also to be 
responsible for the management of services and a portion of the costs, including one half 
of the costs of social assistance. 
103 Ontario, Association of Municipalities of Ontario, "Local Services realignment - a user's guide", 
Queen's Printer, 1999, p.6.2 
104 Provincial-Municipal Services Realignment, Social and Community Health Services, Implementation 
Project, "Consolidation of Municipal Services Management - Consolidation Planning Framework: Northern 
Ontario," January 1998, p. 1. 
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A general hue and cry went out from both the large cities, because of their high 
population of poor, and from all communities that were concerned with the negative 
effects this would have in periods of economic downturn. The Association of 
Municipalities of Ontario (AMO) lead the assault on the new funding arrangements and 
negotiations began between the province and AMO to re-think the cost sharing 
apportionment. An article by James Rusk, defines the funding problems faced by 
municipalities because of the announcement, saying "It came under quick attack 
because it would have required municipalities to absorb $4.2 billion more a year in 
housing, welfare, health and social-service costs."105 Rusk indicates that there was 
extreme secrecy in the provincial decision making on the original cost sharing. His 
interpretation of how the decisions were made indicate that Conservative caucus 
member had been shown the financial data on the programs and given opportunity to 
"make their bids,"106 but indicates that, 
"sources close to both the talks and the efforts to broker a new deal, the basic 
parameter within which the plan will be rewritten are now clearly understood by 
all sides. It must allow for: 
• taking education costs off property taxes, reforming school boards and asserting 
strong provincial control over the province's new schools; 
• province-wide standards for municipally administered social services; 
• no new money to put on the table; 
• the need to reduce financial uncertainty for municipalities, the primary purpose 
for revising the plan."107 
• 
In May 1997, a re-working of the downloaded funding arrangements was concluded but 
this apportionment of costs was to change again, to the present funding arrangements 
below. 
105 Rusk, James, "Ontario to scrap offloading proposal," Globe & Mail. May 1997 (Actual date not 
available), pp. Al and A10. 
106 Ibid., p. A10. 
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The government was committed to moving forward with their realignment strategies 
and creating the needed governance and administrative structures that would be 
required. The government wanted to ensure that the same standards and same services 
were available throughout the Northern Districts, with Boards making district-wide 
decisions and speaking with one voice. 
THE DISTRICT OF COCHRANE 
The District of Cochrane contains 145,618 square kilometres in Northeastern Ontario. 
An attached map indicates the geographic location and the vast area of the District.109 
The area's population is concentrated in one City, Timmins, and then distributed among 
107Ibid.,p.A10 
108 Ontario, Association of Municipalities of Ontario, "Local Services realignment - a user's guide", 
Queen's Printer, 1999, pp. 4.1-4.61 
109 See Appendix B. 
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communities along the Highway 11 Corridor.110 The large unincorporated area contains 
a relatively small population. Population is relatively stable, dropping by 675 or 0.7 
percent from 1991 to 1996.111 The following chart indicates the incorporated municipal 
areas and their population.112 




See Appendix C. 
Canada, Statistics Canada, 1991 & 1996 Census, Special Tabulations, Online, Internet http://www.on.hrdc-
drhc.gc.ca/english/lmi/eaid/ore/cen96/no/590pop e.html 
112 Canada, Statistics Canada, 1996 Census, Special Tabulations, Online, Internet http://www.on.hrdc-
drhc.gc.ca/english/lmi/eaid/ore/cen96/no/590pop e.html 
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j«"^ The City of Timmins, Social Services Department, had a staff compliment of 
approximately 19 (18.6 full time equivalents)113. They delivered Ontario Works to an 
average monthly caseload of 1490114, within the boundaries of the City. The Cochrane 
District Welfare Board had a staff compliment of approximately 17 (16.5 full time 
equivalents)115. They delivered Ontario Works to an average monthly caseload of 531116 
to the remaining incorporated areas of the district. The provincial Ministry of 
Community and Social Services delivered services to approximately 1500117cases. These 
cases included sole support parents, who were previously recipients of Family Benefits, 
and Ontario Works clients in the unincorporated area of the District. 
CITY OF TIMMINS, SOCIAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT 
The City's CAO and Council's main priorities in the last five years have been on debt 
reduction, budget reduction and staffing reduction.118 The City was overly concerned 
with staffing costs. The Ontario Works Act has a requirement for more intensive 
employment focused programming. The staff required, to deliver the intensive 
employment programs, was not approved, because of budget concerns. The Ontario 
Works Business plan119 did not integrate supportive employment programming with 
financial assistance. Only two additional staff were approved to deliver employment 
services to a caseload of approximately 1500. The caseload ratio for caseworkers 
113 Cochrane DSSAB Working Group, Consolidation/Integration Implementation Plan,, p. 19 
114 Cochrane DSSAB Working Group, Consolidation/Integration Implementation Plan, Monthly caseload 
statistics - January to July 1998, p. 12. 
115 Ibid., p. 19. 
116 Ibid., p. 12. 
"7 Ibid., pp. 12-13. 
118 From a conversation with the former Director of Social Services, City of Timmins. 
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/#*^ remained at 250:1. These budget-related decisions led to an inability to provide the 
intensive employment supports and deliver the programs as they were designed. 
The organization did have professional management skills and an understanding of 
new public management concepts of results-orientation, accountability and the 
management of change. Senior management staff of the Department of Social Services 
co-wrote the Ontario Works Business Plan. The City had service standard policies in 
place. For example, one such service standard was a requirement that an applicant, if 
eligible for assistance, would receive their entitlement within four days of their original 
intake. They also fully understood the financial consequences of not meeting targets set 
in the service contract. The staff's negotiating ability enabled them to have the ministry 
-p^ accept reasonable targets to be accomplished with limited resources and the 
organization dedicated available resources to ensuring that they accomplished 
fulfillment of the targets that had been set. They designed a monitoring system, by 
which they could assess if targets were being met and were able to make adjustments 
and ensure resources were dedicated to fulfilling the requirements for receiving 
funding. They also made use of in-house expertise in employment programming and 
utilized their relationship with community partners to ensure community placement 
targets were met. The City, even with its limited resources, never had funding "clawed-
back" for failure to meet funding based targets.120 
119 City of Timmins, "Ontario Works Business Plan", 1996 
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THE DISTRICT OF COCHRANE WEI ?ARE BOARD 
Employment focused programs, welfare fraud detection, results orientation, 
accountability and change management are new public management theories to 
required to be implemented in the reformed social assistance world. The District of 
Cochrane Welfare Administration Board (CDWAB) did not reflect organization capacity 
in these areas. The CDWAB, although maintaining a caseload ratio of 80:1, did not have 
expertise in, technology, employment programs, financial accountability, setting and 
monitoring performance measures or the professional management skills to manage the 
change. Third party on-line checking through the Employment Insurance, Ministry of 
—^ Transportation, and Equifax credit bureau databases required technological expertise 
and infrastructure, not found in smaller organizations like the CDWAB. The cost for the 
technology and the cost of long distance connections to these databases were seen as 
being too expensive for the benefits gained. The CDWAB Ontario Works Business 
Plan,121, was written by an external consultant, with little input from management 
staff.122 Their inability to adapt to new methods of delivery was highlighted because 
they continued to deliver social assistance, as in the "old days". For example, time 
intensive home visits were maintained. The organization was not particularly 
customer-focused. The time frame, from first application until receipt of benefits, could 
be up to two weeks. They did not have any plans to migrate to the new way of doing 
business, including phone first applications and a maximum time standard of client 
/#™^ I20 Ministry of Community and Social Services, "Ontario Works 1996-97 Final Reconciliation and 
' Recovery Report, "Ontario Works 1998 Final Reconciliation - Summary". 
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service. These standards are now being introduced by regulation. Hampered by an 
inability to change the way they did business, and the lack of technical and managerial 
expertise needed to plan and set appropriate targets, adjust goals, recognize 
implications and negotiate appropriate targets with the ministry, the organization 
faltered when results based funding was introduced. There was no high level 
commitment in the organization to change and to the process of change management 
required with staff. The inability to meet stated performance goals cost the DWAB 
$118,270.00123 in 1998. This funding had already been spent on administering programs, 
but due to lack of target achievement, the money was "clawed-back", by the province. 
THE FORMATION OF THE CDSSAB 
Many areas of the North124, Cochrane District included, would opt for the voluntary 
decision to create either ASBs or DSSABs with geographical jurisdictions being 
separated cities and separate District organizations. This would have created fourteen 
service delivery agencies. This was not many more than the ten125 eventually created by 
the province. The government would not accept these locally determined solutions. 
The reason was the present organizations would not be suitable for their alternate 
service delivery plans. Some organizations, particularly the smaller District Welfare 
Boards did not have the new public management organizational prerequisites and 
121 District of Cochrane Welfare Administration Board, "Ontario Works Business Plan", 1997. 
122 From a conversation with the former Administrator, CDWAB, 1999. 
123 Ministry of Community and Social Services, "Ontario Works 1998 Final Reconciliation - Summary", 
North Bay Area Office, August 16,1999. 
124 Based on a review of proposals from Thunder Bay, Kenora, Manitoulin, Cochrane 
125 Ontario, Statute, The District Social Service Administration Act, 1998. 
r 
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capacity to deliver the downloaded services, including services presently delivered by 
the Ministry. The status quo, or a tinkering therewith, was not an option. 
The communities along the Highway 11 corridor developed a Cochrane North Coalition 
to examine options for the delivery of social services in the District. Initially, in the 
District of Cochrane, it appeared that there might be a co-operative regional solution. 
An article in the Timmins Times, entitled Timmins for help, of March 19,1997, Chris 
Polehoykie reports that "Northern municipalities have all but admitted that they won't 
be able to deal with the massive down-loading of services the government of Ontario 
made during 'Mega Week' announcements in January and are interested in talking to 
Timmins with the potential goal of setting up a district-wide agency to delivery 
services."126 At a meeting of the Cochrane North Municipal Coalition on March 16, 
1997, Don E. Moorhouse, project manager for Who Does What implementation for 
Northern Ontario, indicated that, with services being turned over to municipalities in 
1998, "...if s time to start thinking about how to deliver some of them."127 Moorhouse 
was quoted, "Collapse a few (other) boards and eliminate the duplication. Thaf s where 
the savings will come from."128 Germain Lacoursiere, then senior advisor with the 
Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing acknowledged that restructuring would be 
difficult to achieve within the 1998 timeframe but was quoted as saying, "the status quo 
is not an option."129 Lacoursiere indicated that although he didn't know how the 
Cochrane North Coalition felt about Timmins, but that they should consider including 
the larger centre as they had the required resources and could assist in the delivery of 
126 Polehoykie, Chris, Timmins for help, Timmins Times, Wednesday, March 19, 1997 
127 Ibid. 
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services.130 Frank Albani, Administrator for the Town of Kapuskasing agreed that 
Tirnmins was the "centre where you find the most services and looking at the options, it 
would cost less."131 The Cochrane District Working Group was formed in the spring of 
1997 and included members from the Coalition and the City CAO, as a representative 
from the City of Timmins. At a meeting held on May 3,1997, the Working Group 
approved the following parameters and objectives,132 focused mainly on cost: 
• The service delivery agency would provide cost efficient and economical services to 
the region with centralized administration, where possible. 
• The agency could provide additional services to member municipalities or member 
municipalities could be contracted with to provide the services or the services could 
be contracted out to the private sector 
• The services were also defined into primary functions, secondary functions, and low 
priority functions. 
There appears to have been some confusion around the requirements of legislated 
functions as two mandated services, childcare and social housing were not included in 
function list. Assessment, not a service to be delivered, was included.133 There also 
appears to be other conflicting information in the minutes. Although centralized 
administration was mentioned in the objectives, further discussion on management and 




sr* 1JI Ibid. 
T l32 Cochrane District Working Group, Minutes of Meeting, May 3,1997, Kapuskasing, p. 1 
133 Ibid., p. 2. 
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administration and a Service Delivery Agency would not require support staff to deliver 
the services"134 
The Cochrane District Services Board mandate would be; "a service and delivery 
agency, whereby the Board would not only coordinate the delivery of services, but also 
be the purchaser of such services."135 The Working Group also indicated "that it should 
not create another level of bureaucracy.. .and recommended that once elected 
representatives have reached decision regarding the.. .Board and to proceed further 
with the proposal, the matter of administration and management be referred back to 
administrative staff for recommendation."136 In the report by the Cochrane North 
Municipal Working Group to the Cochrane North Coalition's Municipal Study Group, 
although the objectives stressed that the "key components in the delivery of services are 
cost-effectiveness and efficiency ...the main goal should be to amalgamate 
administrative function and reduce staffing components by implementing centralized 
administration ... one administration governing all agencies...such administration 
service .. .should be given to member municipalities or the private sector on a contract 
basis."137 Private sector provision of Ontario Works was not allowed by legislation. 
The group emphasized, "another level of bureaucracy is not to be created by the 
creation of the Board."138 These decisions would leave, in the author's opinion, only one 
option for the central administration, that of the City of Timmins. However, after 
consideration, this would not be acceptable to the District municipalities. The Group 
134 Ibid., p. 2. 
135 Ibid, p. 2. 
136 Ibid, p. 2. 
137 Cochrane North Municipal Working Group to the Cochrane North Municipal Study Group, "Report to 
establish a Service Delivery Model," presented May 7, 1997, p. 5. 
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/f*^ appeared confused about several issues. Concerns were expressed, at a March 15,1997 
of the Cochrane North Municipal Coalition, about the lack of information available from 
the province, especially since there was the expectation that the delivery agent be in 
place by January 1,1998. Although invited, the City of Timmins was not represented at 
the meeting. It was recommended that the City, to facilitate further negotiations, host 
the next meeting.139 The Town of Kapuskasing, on behalf of the Cochrane North 
Municipal Coalition, initiated district-wide negotiations on upper tier governance 
discussions with a letter of invitation for Timmins to host a meeting for discussion 
purposes.140 Bad feelings erupted however, when City representatives did not receive 
an invitation to a meeting of the Coalition, held on May 24,1997, in Kapuskasing. In a 
letter to the Coalition, Mayor Power of Timmins states that during that meeting, 
^p^ "without warning or explanation, the Cochrane North Municipal Coalition passed a 
resolution to remove our CAO from the Committee that had been appointed to draft 
terms of reference for a consultant." 141 The mayor of Timmins continues that Timmins 
"certainly does not feel welcome at meetings of the Cochrane North Municipal 
Coalition"142 and that Timmins' position on representation by population as 
recommended in the MNDM presentation Approaches to Consolidating Service 
Delivery in Northern Ontario" remained unchanged. The battle lines were drawn; the 
North Coalition feared absorption by the more powerful City. The City wanted 
financial and decision making control. Future cooperation was impaired. 
138 Ibid., p. 6. 
139 Minutes of the Cochrane North Municipal Coalition meeting, March 15,1997, held in Kapuskasing 
140 Fax Memorandum from Barbara Major, Coordinator, Special Projects, Town of Kapuskasing, dated 
March 17,1997. 
141 Letter from Mayor Victor Power, City of Timmins to Mayor Fred Poulin, Chair Cochrane North 
Municipal Coalition, dated June 12, 1997. 
142 Ibid. 
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/#"v In a May 30,1997 presentation, Approaches to Consolidating Service Delivery in 
Northern Ontario, the reasoning behind "Who Does What" decisions remained "lower 
costs and taxes"143 The Ministry of Northern Development and Mines did, however, 
acknowledge that there was "currently no mechanism to deliver and recover the costs of 
services on an area-wide basis in the North"144 but stated it was not about local 
restructuring. The literature review indicates that indeed, it was. The province needed 
this restructuring to occur in order for organizations to be in place to meet their 
alternate service delivery objectives. The presentation also suggested that 
representative be reflective of population size, a statement that the City was to latch on 
to during negotiations. 
^^ When it was apparent that an Area Service Board would not be voluntarily created, the 
edict to begin local deliberations to form a CDSSAB, was issued from the Minister of 
Community and Social Services. A transition board was formed, however animosity 
developed quickly. Division lines were drawn almost immediately between the City of 
Timmins, the City, and the rest of the District, the District. The City was viewed, by the 
District, as the big player, who would try to control and impose their citified solutions 
on the rest of the district. This perception was not hindered by the City's proposal that 
they have the majority of members on the board. Both parties were extremely 
concerned over how the costs would be apportioned and about keeping costs down. 
Both Timmins and District politicians made inflammatory comments in newspapers. In 
discussing representation on the board, Mayor Power of Timmins felt that since the City 
143 Ministry of Northern Development and Mines, "Approaches to Consolidating Service Delivery in 
Northern Ontario," Slides from Presentation, May 30,1997. 
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would be the largest financial contributor to the board, they should have the most 
representation. " He who pays the piper should call the tune."145 And "If it's not going 
to cost those municipalities very much, they're likely to spend like drunken sailors."146 
The District politicians responded with their own concerns about the City having 
control over the board. "There are concerns from those representing communities like 
Hearst, Cochrane, Iroquois Falls and Kapuskasing that a Timmins-dominated board 
could simply close satellite offices and run all services from one office in Timmins."147 
The Coalition submitted a proposal for a Northeast Services Delivery Agency on July 5, 
1997. The territory to be covered excluded the City of Timmins. The Cochrane North 
Coalition had agreed that they wanted to retain the Cochrane District Welfare Board to 
dispense core services148. The City submitted their proposal149 for the establishment of 
the Cochrane District Area Services Board in September 1997. The proposed ASB would 
contract with the City to continue to deliver services to its residents and would also 
contract with a Northern delivery agent to deliver services to the residents of the North 
and unincorporated areas. There was the provision that either of the two groups could 
contract with the other to provide or acquire services. The ASB would have the ability 
to determine service levels for all communities except for the City. The City would be a 
non-voting member, determining its own levels of service. The City would be prepared 
to be the contract service provided to the District municipalities and unincorporated 
144 Ibid. 
us Ron Grech, "Rallying for representation," Timmins, The Daily Press. June 27, 1998, City page. 
146 Darrel Greer, "Services board could spend like "drunken sailors," says Mayor Power," Timmins The 
Timmins Times. July 11. 1998, p. 1. 
147 Ron Grech, "Negotiations to draft social service board stymied," Timmins, The Daily Press. January 19, 
1998, City page. 
148 Cochrane North Municipal Coalition, North East Services Delivery Agency proposal, July 1997 
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areas, on a cost recovery basis. The City wanted the clear understanding that there 
would not be an increase of providing core services to the City.150 Both proposals 
missed the mark. The importance to the province's downloading of one professional 
managed service delivery agency with no unincorporated area left not served by the 
DSSAB, or ASB."1 
The City attempted to make peace with the Coalition, stating that their proposal would 
not "attempt to control or take away any policy setting function or decision making 
current the responsibility of other Cochrane District Municipalities"152, while proposing 
that they act as the contracted service delivery agency for core services. They continued 
however with their assertion that representation on an ASB must be representation by 
population. The City of Timmins contained approximately 55 percent of the total 
population.153 
The Northern Services Improvement Act, 1998, confirms that Area Service Boards are 
optional but District Social Services Area Boards would be imposed after April 1,1998, if 
no local solution had been found. It also provided a mechanism for the province to 
charge municipalities for the cost of services that had not, as yet, been downloaded. 
149 City of Timmins, "Area Services Board Proposal," September 1997. 
150 Chevrette, G.B., CAO, City of Timmins, "Report and Recommendation to Timmins Council Re: 
Cochrane District Area Services Board," January 2, 1998. 
151 Interview with Germain Lacoursiere, Regional Director, Ministry of Community and Social Services, 
North Bay Area Office, conducted July 10,2000. 
152 Letter from Council pen Mayor Victor Power, City of Timmins to Cochrane North Coalition, dated July 
24, 1997 
153 Based on Population Census Summary, District of Cochrane, revised September 23, 1994, received with 
Local Services Realignment Package. 
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/»"v Minister Ecker confirms efficiencies were expected in the long-term, in the following 
statement. 
"It would allow for interim funding arrangements to settle who pays for what 
while we continue to work with municipalities on the details of the transfer of the 
programs...Municipalities have to continue to find savings, identify efficiencies 
and keep costs down. ..This bill would allow these services to be delivered and 
funded by municipal governments, which are best able to identify and respond 
to local needs. The end result will be better services, more efficient and 
accountable government, and property tax reduction in future years."154 
Although the Coalition continued meeting, and inviting Timmins, through January of 
1998, there would be no agreement on an ASB for the Cochrane District. Separate 
proposals were submitted and the province rejected both. 
Understanding the main points of contention, governance control and cost sharing, that 
were arising between separated cities and the rest of the Districts in the North, the 
' province redefined some of the parameters. They were committed to the establishment 
of DSSABs, at a minimum. It was the only solution to their alternate service delivery 
plans. The province remained committed to having approximately 50 municipal service 
managers, about 10 in Northern Ontario to deliver the mandatory services.155 
On September 2,1997, Janet Ecker and Chris Hodgson sent a joint letter to 
municipalities advising the approach that would be followed in determining which 
154 Ontario, Ministry of Community and Social Services, Backgrounder, "Legislation paves the way for 
Who Does What reforms," August 21,1997, p. 30. 
155 Provincial-Municipal Services Realignment, Social and Community Health Services, Implementation 
Project, "Consolidation of Municipal Services Management - Consolidation Planning Framework: Northern 
Ontario," January 1998, p. 1. 
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municipalities and/or boards would be the consolidated managers.156 Ministers Ecker 
and Leach confirmed, by letter on December 18,1997 that the policies would apply to 
the municipal management of Ontario Works, childcare and social housing.157 In a 
January 1998 document, Consolidation of Municipal Services Management -
Consolidation Planning Framework: Northern Ontario, January 1998158 changes were 
specified. DSSABs no longer had to manage public health or land ambulance. They 
could apply to the Minister of Health to do so, but if they did not, a municipality would 
manage land ambulance services and the local board of health would continue to 
manage public health. If an ASB could not be voluntarily formed, a voluntary proposal 
for a DSSAB was required by March 31,1998, or there would be provincial imposition of 
geographic boundaries and governance in a provincial creation of a DSSAB by the end 
of May 1998. Representation would be specified in legislation, but the expectation was 
that elected representatives from municipalities and unincorporated areas would sit on 
the board. The definitive requirements for consolidation listed in a slide presentation 
stated that consolidation arrangements must: 
• "have local agreement, 
include unincorporated areas, 
• meet the requirement of about 10, 
• not leave gaps in the service area, 
• have clear accountability arrangements."159 
156 Ontario, Provincial-Municipal Services Realignment, Social and Community Health Implementation 
Project, Presentation, "Consolidation of Municipal Services Management - Northern Ontario," January 29, 
1998, p. 1. 
'"Ibid., p. 1. 
158 Provincial-Municipal Services Realignment, Social and Community Health Services, Implementation 
Project, "Consolidation of Municipal Services Management - Consolidation Planning Framework: Northern 
Ontario," January 1998, pp. 1-11. 
159 Ontario, Provincial-Municipal Services Realignment, Social and Community Health Implementation 
Project, Presentation, "Consolidation of Municipal Services Management - Northern Ontario," January 29, 
1998, p. 6. 
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No mention is made, at this point, of representation being apportioned by population. 
The plans for a DSSAB must contain^: 
• Identification of municipalities and unincorporated areas and the geographic are 
covered 
• Whether a DSSAB or a single municipality will manage services 
• Council resolutions and demonstration of consent from unincorporated areas to 
support the proposal 
• Description of how representation and accountability will be addressed 
• Description of service area, including population, client base, accessibility of 
services, provision of services in French where applicable, linkages with other social 
service providers 
• Listing of other social and community health services DSSAB wishes to provide 
• Description of cost apportionment 
• Outline of organization capacity required to manage programs and how it will be 
developed 
• Timetable 
Organizational capacity was now being specifically defined as being important. The 
document also details the requirement for a technical infrastructure for the delivery of 
Ontario Works, something which was not available in all present delivery sites and the 
necessity to transfer the sole support and foster parent and unincorporated OW works 
caseloads presently being served by MCSS offices. The Consolidation Planning 
Framework for Northern Ontario indicates the necessity to have technical infrastructure 
160 Provincial-Municipal Services Realignment, Social and Community Health Services, Implementation 
Project, "Consolidation of Municipal Services Management - Consolidation Planning Framework: Northern 
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/f*^ in place. "It is the ministry's goal to have the technology foundation for the future in 
place by the end of 1998."i« 
Although meetings continued to be held, on March 31,1998, the City of Timmins 
submitted its proposal for the CDSSAB, the Coalition had submitted its own proposal. 
The default provisions of the legislation were enacted and the province established the 
geographic boundaries for the CDSSAB. The geographic area was to be the entire 
District of Cochrane, including Timmins. Talks continued regarding representation, but 
an agreement again could not be reached. In a letter dated August 10,1998162, Ministers 
of Community and Social Service and Northern Development and Mines prescribed 
representation in a letter to the Coalition and the City. Representation would later be 
—^ prescribed in legislation163 as follows: 
• Six representatives from the City 
• Five representative from all other municipalities 
• One representative from unincorporated areas 
• One representative to be provincially appointed 
Expectations were stated that a working group be formed as soon as possible to develop 
an implementation plan, service delivery model and the transfer of responsibilities. The 
transfer of service responsibilities would take place December 31,1998. The working 
group was formed, consisting of administrative and political representation from both 
Ontario," January 1998. 
161 Ibid., p. 12. 
r162 Letter from Ministers Ecker and Hodgins to Cochrane North Coalition and City of Timmins, August 10, 
1998. 
163 Ontario, Statutes, The District Social Services Administration Board Act, 1998. 
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/wv the City and the Coalition group. The first meeting was held August 20,1998 and a 
consulting firm was selected to begin work, in consultation with both the City's Social 
Service Department and the CDWAB management staff, to develop an implementation 
plan.164 Even though there was still a great deal of hostility among the working group, 
the senior level administrative staff from both organizations worked co-operatively and 
tirelessly, with the consultant, to prepare an Implementation Plan. The plan would 
focus on the establishment of an organization capable of implementing the 
government's alternate service delivery initiative. 
On October 13,1998, simmering hostilities resulted in a joint letter from Co-chairs of the 
Working group, Mayor Power of Timmins and Mayor Caron of Kapuskasing, to 
^^ Ministers Ecker and Hodgson. The letter requested, in light of differences, an 
immediate meeting with both Ministers to discuss two separate boards for the District of 
Cochrane.165 
The government was committed to their path, notwithstanding local political objections. 
An October 21,1998 letter from Janet Ecker contained a definitive no to the request for a 
meeting, a commendation on the tremendous progress on the implementation plan, and 
an encouragement to continue the work.166 Work continued on the implementation plan 
and plans for forming the new CDSSAB board and hiring employees. Thorny issues, 
164 Minutes of a Meeting of the Cochrane District Social Services Administration Board Working Group, 
August 20, 1998 
165 Letter from Mayor V.M Power and Mayor J. C. Caron, Co-chairs, Cochrane District Social Services 
Administration Board Working Group, October 13,1998. 
166 Letter from Janet Ecker, Minister of Community and Social Services, October 21, 1998. 
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#"*v including the hiring of a CAO, and the dissolution of assets and liabilities of the DWAB 
were resolved and the new CDSSAB received its designation on February 1,1999.167 
Why was the province so unyielding in its insistence of the formation of this new 
regional special purpose body and administration, despite local political objections? It 
is this author's belief that the reasoning was, both plans in essence, retained the current 
organizations. The government, who currently contracted services with both, did not 
feel that either had the organization capacity to meet their objectives. Each of the 
former organizations had organizational issues that would hamstring them in the 
provincially envisioned provision of region-wide, customer-centred delivery of services. 
The City was preoccupied with cost, over program delivery. The CDWAB did not have 
the managerial and functional expertise. 
THE NEW DISTRICT OF COCHRANE SOCIAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION 
BOARD 
One short-term goal clarified by literature and document review was the formation of 
an organization that would embrace new public management theory to enable the 
envisioned integrated, customer-responsive delivery of community and health services 
in the North. The CDSSAB organization is reflective of new public management 
theorem. Most of the senior management team are committed to ensuring an 
167 Letter from Cynthia Lees, Area Manager, North Bay Area Office to co-Chairs of the CDSSAB Working 
Group, dated January 12, 1999. 
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organization that reflects the best of these management theories, while maintaining the 
public sector values of equity and respect for both clients and staff. 
The new organization builds on the strengths of the old organizations, the lower 
caseload and understanding of delivery over a wide geographical area of the DWAB, 
the professional management, technical and financial expertise of the City. The ability 
of the new, more progressive organization, to anticipate and adapt to changes, with new 
public management skills, expertise in employment programming, finance, technology, 
setting and monitoring performance measures and the management of change. What 
has been created is a more responsive organization, caseload ration of 120:1, enabling 
caseworkers to give more intensive employment supports. 
The organization has its head office in Timmins, maintains the former offices of the 
DWAB as satellite offices, and has assumed the former MCSS office in Moosonee for 
service delivery to that area. It is positioned to deliver the regional client-centred 
services. It has developed effective wide-area network technology to facilitate 
communication between offices and make the transition to the new Service Delivery 
Model for Ontario Works. 
Within four months of its designation, a tremendous amount of organizational work 
had been accomplished. The consolidation of the two organizational databases was 
complete, full staff complement was hired and trained in program delivery. A wide area 
network, integrated with the province's system, was providing data and voice services 
to all offices. The integration of sole support cases and unincorporated cases was 
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complete, the new head office was fully functional and plans for moving or renovating 
three of the satellite offices were underway. 
The Implementation Plan168 draws on many new public management theories, reflecting 
a professionally managed, team-oriented, responsive, accountable organization, 
committed to employee development and to delivering client-focused services 
efficiently and effectively. 
"An integrated model of (service) delivery was chosen to eliminate unnecessary 
duplication, streamline the service path and promote an achievement culture." "The 
management and staff structure approved has been designed to empower staff to take 
ownership of their profession development, contributing to organization goals and 
assuming accountability for achieving their fair share or organizational targets. The new 
organization has a flat management structure with the flexibility to adapt to the changing 
service environment. Approximately 60 staff will serve some 3,500 Ontario Works cases, 
deliver and manage Child Care and prepare to assimilate Social Housing services." 
"Strategies to assume the management and delivery of Child Care Programs were created 
to maintain purchase of service arrangements while reducing duplicitous delivery 
functions...streamlining service to clients." "Overall, the level of service delivery has 
been enhanced and will be available in both official languages in all offices." "A 
comprehensive training plan details the required and recommended information and 
training for all Board and staff members in the new organization. Critical training must 
be completed prior to March 31, 1999, in order to ensure that the required knowledge and 
skills reside within the new organization to assume the full range of delivery 
responsibilities. Supplementary training will unfold thereafter." 
The training plan contained within the Implementation Plan delineates the training 
required to ensure a high performance and achievement culture within the 
organization. However, several of the theoretical necessities that were addressed in the 
literature review, are only listed as moderate priorities. The training activities169, which 
reflect new public management theory, include: 
• strategic planning for the DSSAB Board 
• development of a foundation of trust and development of high performance teams, 
for all management staff leadership training for the CAO 
168 The Cochrane DSSAB Working Group, "A Consolidation/Integration Implementation Plan for the 
Cochrane District Social Services Administration Board," December 18, 1998, pp. 1-2. 
169 Ibid., pp. 60-63. 
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• management training including empowering management techniques, divesting 
autonomy and decision making, building support and managing teams and conflict 
resolution for program managers 
• training on building a foundation of trust and team building for all front-line staff 
• customer service training for support staff 
The delay in undertaking this training is understandable; as the first order of business 
was to form the organization and have the staff gain the technical skills needed to 
deliver the programs. The technical training on understanding and delivering 
programs was high priority and was completed, in order that the organization could 
deliver the current services. 
New public management theory, discovered in the literature review, purports that the 
most successful public organizations ensure, as part of their strategic planning, that the 
organization has established a clear vision and mission. Successful public sector 
organizations must also ensure, according to the literature, that they are embracing 
critical client-centred values. 
During 1999, the CDSSAB conducted, with the assistance of the consultant who had 
worked on the Implementation Plan, an organizational visioning exercise and the 
preparation of a policy and procedures manual. The senior management team felt the 
importance of maintaining the same consultant as they believed that during joint work 
on the Implementation Plan, a good fit had occurred between management's 
organizational objectives and the mind set of the consultant. Senior management staff 
participated in a session to determine a clear vision. A draft vision was distributed to 
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all staff for feedback, prior to its finalization. The vision statement170 reflects the desire 
to be a client<entred, responsive to community organization valuing the individuality 
of residents. The statement is intended to address the relationship building that is 
required with all communities' residents, attempting to undo some of the bad feelings 
that remained from the political turmoil surrounding the CDSSAB formation. The 
Vision also includes the guiding principles171 for the organization, including; 
• "respect for applicants, participants, staff and community partners," 
• effective communication with applicants, staff and community partners, 
encouragement of individual professional development and team growth, and 
• "unity - bringing together the interest of all to achieve our common purpose." 
Toward the end of 1999, the same consultant was again hired to facilitate the writing of 
a Policy and Procedure Manual172 for the CDSSAB. The intent of the manual is that it 
acts as a first source reference for staff, clarifying program delivery at the CDSSAB. It 
describes the service path, directs staff to the appropriate Ontario Works Directives and 
defines roles and responsibilities. It is designed to enable empowerment in decision 
making for front line staff. The manual also acts as an accountability tool, another new 
public management criteria. It contains local audit requirements for each policy to 
ensure set standards are maintained. A panel of staff, including representation from all 
functional areas and all offices within the CDSSAB met with the consultant for several 
170 See attached Vision Statement, Appendix D. 
171 Ibid. 
172 ADW Consulting and Pauline Lewis & Associates Inc., "District of Cochrane Social Services 
Administration Board Policy and Procedure Manual," May 1, 2000. 
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weeks to reach consensus on the policies and procedures. In determining the 
appropriate policies and procedures, decisions were measured, 
"against the degree to which specific activities will contribute to the achievement 
of the vision. Decisions, especially those where some discretion can be exercised, 
will be examined and measured in the context of how they relate to the 
organizational vision and guiding principles. Staff will be encouraged to make 
decisions and demonstrate behaviors which are consistent with these principles." 
173 
DATA ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Effectiveness is defined as outcome over objectives. Outcome measures focus on the 
real reason for spending, whether the service is effective in meeting the mission or goals 
set. Outcome measures demonstrate to funding agencies, the public and politicians that 
the organization is accomplishing its mission and goals. 
The effectiveness measures chosen, by the researcher, were determined by the 
importance the provincial government places on two key performance measures. The 
only measures, in 1998 and 1999, which were directly related to funding were 
community participation targets and participation agreements signed by clients. In 
2000, the province is adjusting its results based funding; funding will be based on 
provincially pre-determined levels of service to be delivered to clients. The 
organization will again have to have the capacity to adjust to reflect these new, 
mandatory for funding, service levels. 
173 Ibid., p. 1.2-1.3. 
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#*^ The province is, consistent with new public management theory, moving towards more 
outcome based funding. In 2000, funding for all employment-based services will be 
directly related to level of service to clients. Delivery agents will "earn" their money by 
target achievement of client service levels. As long as specified levels of service are 
delivered to client, there will be flexibility in spending, both on client expenses and on 
administrative functions, allowed. In late 1999 the province announced that there 
would be bonuses for those agencies that exceeded the provincial targets for community 
placements. This was an incentive for organizations to become more results oriented. 
The objectives of the provincial government have been clearly defined; to provide 
community placements and employment supports to enable the shortest route to 
employment for clients. This commitment to enable social assistance recipients through 
-^ employment supports and community placements is supported by results-based 
funding. During 1998 and 1999, only the two aforementioned areas of provincial 
funding that were determined by target achievement. 
The determination of effectiveness is always more relevant when it can be compared. 
The effectiveness of the CDSSAB will be compared with the effectiveness two previous 
organizations, the City of Timmins and the District of Cochrane Welfare Administration 
Board. 
When conducting research, validity of the data is an important factor. The assessment of 
the Ontario Works target achievement, both for community placement and participation 
agreements constitute a nebulous exercise. Several factors complicate accurate 
assessment of this data. Targets are set annually, for the yearly Service Contract with 
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the Ministry of Community and Social Services. Service contracts do not reflect 
monthly targets. The target achievement data is housed in the Ontario Works 
Technology database. Once the two Ontario Works databases, the former City of 
Timmins and the former CDWAB, were merged in May 1999, all data for January to 
April from the two former organizations was merged, making it impossible to assess 
target achievement by the two former organizations for the period of January to April 
1999. For this reason, target achievement for the City and the CDWAB will be based on 
the fiscal year preceding the amalgamation, 1998. Target achievement for the CDSSAB 
will be based on the fiscal year of 1999. This will not accurately reflect the new 
organization's ability to meet targets, but will provide an approximation of the potential 
for effectiveness. 
174 Ministry of Community and Social Services," CDWAB, Ontario Works 1998 Final Reconciliation -
Summary." 
175 Ministry of Community and Social Services, "City of Timmins, Ontario Works 1998 Final 
Reconciliation - Summary." 
176 CDSSAB, "Ontario Works Database Statistical Report, 1999", February 2000. 
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/"■*> One will note the percentage of caseload represented by targets is much higher in the 
CDWAB than either the City or the CDSSAB. This reflects the CDWABs inability to set 
reachable targets and the inability to negotiate reasonable targets with the Ministry.177 
There was also no on-going monitoring of target achievement at the CDWAB.178 The 
management of the City was able to negotiate more organizationally appropriate 
targets. City management staff also monitored target achievement in order to assure 
that funding-based targets were met. The CDWAB had not achieved their Ontario 
Works performance targets in the past. The CDSSAB had only been operating as an 
integrated organization for nine months of the 1999-year, but was during the period of 
intensive change, was still able to meet the performance targets, bodes well for future 
effectiveness. 
In January 2000, the government announced increased funding179 was being made 
available to Ontario Works delivery agents. Those delivery agents that exceeded 
provincial minimum targets for community placement, would receive increased 
funding of $1,000.00 per placement above minimum targets of 15% in 1999-2000 and 
$500.00 for each placement achieved above the 2000-2001 target of 22.5% and the 2001-
2002 target of 30%. The money could be used to address unmet human service needs 
within the delivery agent's area. The CDSSAB achieved 197 percent of provincial 
expectations of a minimum of 15% of caseload, in community placements and received 
177 From a conversation with the former Administrator, CDWAB, summer 1999. 
178 Ibid. 
179 Ontario, Ministry of Community and Social Services, Ontario Works Bulletin, "Implementation of 
Increased Funding for Community Placement Targets", January 20,2000, pp. 1-6. 
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/#"v "bonus" money in the amount of $370,000.0018° for the period of April 1999 - March 
2000. 
Another short-term goal of the province was their commitment to decrease the size of 
the public service, with their relatively high salary cost, and strong provincial union. 
This analysis will consist of examination of the reduction in program and administrative 
staffing in the Timmins District offices of the Ministry of Community and Social 
Services, and a comparison of staffing of the former delivery organizations and the new 
CDSSAB. Ministry staff earned approximately $15,000.00 more than comparable staff 
in both the CDWAB and City organizations.181 The reduction of Ministry of Community 
and Social Service staff in the District of Cochrane was:182 
14 Family Benefit Act (FBA) program staff 
4 FBA support staff 
2 FBA managers 
2 administrative staff positions 
There was a total reduction of 22 provincial staff in Timmins District offices, which 
served the District of Cochrane, and a comparative increase of 20183 program and 
180 Ontario, Ministry of Community and Social Services, "Ontario Works Placements 1999-2000", June 6, 
2000. 
181 From a review of salary scales, City of Timmins, Cochrane District Welfare Board, Province of Ontario 
182 Ron Devost, Program Manager, Ministry of Community and Social Services, North Bay, provided July 
1999. 
183 Based on organizational charts, City of Timmins, Social Services Department, 19 staff, 1998; CDWAB, 
19 staff, 1998, CDSSAB, 1999,58 staff. There are some caveats surrounding the staffing information. The 
City's Department of Social Services did not maintain dedicated staff for the provision of accounting and 
personnel services. They purchased their financial and personnel administration services centrally from 
other City departments. The DSSAB handles its own finance and personnel administrative functions. The 
CDSSAB, early in 2000, increased it's staffing by six, all middle-level management positions183, to handle 
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zf^ administrative staff in the CDSSAB, in 1999. The staff in the DSSAB, however, delivered 
the more intensive Ontario Works employment program. The author cannot state 
categorically that there was a total provincial reduction in the public service caused by 
devolution of services. This case study does show the goal of reducing the Ontario 
Public Service has been achieved in the District of Cochrane. 
The province's goal in the establishment of the CDSSAB was to solve the particular 
problems that emerged, in Northern Ontario, from the changes they were making in the 
management and delivery of social services provincially. Their choice, to force the 
consolidation of the CDSSAB was based, in the short-term on new public management 
theories around organizational effectiveness and capacity, and on their desire to fulfil 
^p^ their promise of a reduction in the public service, not on the frequently stated efficiency. 
They do, however, retain efficiency as a long-term goal and believe it can be realized as 
future services are devolved. 
During this early stage in the CDSSABs history, the organization has proven that it is 
effective in meeting provincial goals. They have developed an organization that can 
effectively deliver Ontario Works throughout the district. The provincial decision to 
create DSSABs was based on the need to have bigger, modernized, flexible institutions 
to deliver devolved services. The CDSSAB Implementation Plan, Vision Statement and 
Policy and Procedure Manual illustrate that the organization embraces the new public 
management theories that the drove provincial decision-making. The CDSSAB reflects 
day to day program management of Ontario Works, childcare, finance and the planning associated with the 
assumption of land ambulance services. 
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j^ client-oriented values, respects and builds relationships with stakeholders and has a 
commitment to employees to encourage building or an achievement culture. 
In the short-term, the provincial objectives have been met 
The last question this paper poses is, will the CDSSAB meet the long-range provincial 
objectives of efficient, effective, integrated human services? Although much of the 
following is speculative, since it can only be determined once all services are 
downloaded, the organization possesses an important capacity, the capacity to change. 
This is an important quality according to new public management theories. This is 
reflective in some recent reorganization and planning for the assumption of future 
services. 
According to new public management theories, effective organizations do not remain 
static. They must have the ability to change as circumstances dictate. They assess their 
strengths and weaknesses in relation to the work that needs to be accomplished. The 
CDSSAB exhibits this quality. During an end of first year review, a senior level 
management assessment indicated that the organization had not been able to achieve 
the empowered, self-directed teams envisioned in the Implementation Plan. The time 
needed to undertake training, required to develop the organizational achievement 
culture that would support empowered employees and self-directed teams, became an 
issue. The CDSSAB, like many organizations, felt they were, "too busy fighting the 
gators to drain the swamp."184 Total quality management theory around self-directed 
184 Robert Denhart, The Pursuit of Significance: Strategies for Managerial Success in Public 
Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth, 1993, p. 3. 
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/"*»> teams indicates that they falter if not enough time and resources are not put into their 
development.185 This is an organizational problem that will need to be addressed if an 
achievement culture is to be realized. 
The organization has recently adjusted the extremely flat organizational structure 
recommended by the consultants to include a middle management layer. The span of 
control was too large for upper level management to handle without empowered teams. 
Management felt it was too difficult to complete their planning and policy functions, 
while handling the day-to-day employee management duties, during the time when 
change was being implemented and new services were being assumed. Middle 
management is now in place to handle the day-to-day management issues. Senior 
management needs to concentrate on the long-term goal of changing the organization to 
an achievement oriented employee empowered culture. They need to take the time to 
receive the training themselves and provide the training required for all staff in the 
organization. 
Training is an essential part of ensuring a productive organization and workforce 
according to new public management theorists. "Organizations must help people gain 
the skills and self-reliance to master the new environment.. ."186 This may be difficult 
when the organization is still in a period of change and still assuming more services. 
Although challenging, the literature review suggests that it is imperative to develop the 
organizational capacity to meet provincial goals. Kernahan emphasizes that in order for 
185 Mark Hequet, "TQM at City Hall," Training. March 1995, p. 64. 
186 Kanter, Rosabeth Moss, "Restoring People to the Heart of the Organization of the Future," in Frances 
Hesslebein, Marshall Goldsmith and Richard Beckhard (eds.), The Organization of the Future. San 
Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1997, p. 142. 
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empowerment to be effective, a significant amount of training must occur. Authority 
cannot be.. ."delegated without the appropriate training to allow for the effective 
exercising of new responsibilities."187 He also discusses other factors that must be 
addressed in order for empowerment to work, including resistance from middle 
managers, fearing loss of power or even jobs.188 The CDSSAB still needs to re-skill some 
managers with coaching rather than authoritarian styles. In order to be a truly effective 
organization, the senior management team needs to reflect and act on the following 
statement, 
"No executive can hide from the fact that his or her team reflects the best and the 
worst of the company's values and norms, and therefore provides a case in point 
for insight into the nature of the adaptive work ahead." 
The CDSSAB must also allocate sufficient resources for training, institute recognition 
and rewards, institute a performance management system and resolve labour relations 
disputes arising from the new way of doing business. As the literature stresses, 
organizations cannot just pay lip service to empowerment.189 The CDSSAB needs to 
include these goals in their future plans. They need a change in culture and values 
"from territory, turf and fear to teamwork, trust and delegated responsibility"190 
Self directed work teams are essential if "flat" organizations are to be effective. Team 
members need to be empowered to make decisions and have to accept this 
empowerment in order to be effective. After years of functioning in a "do as you are 
187 Vantour, ed., Our Story, p. 61 as quoted in Kemaghan, Kenneth, "Empowerment and Public 
Administration: Revolutionary advance or passing fancy?" Canadian Public Administration. 35 (2), 
SUMMER 1992,194-214, p. 208. 
188 Kenneth Kemaghan, "Empowerment and Public Administration: Revolutionary advance or passing 
fancy?" Canadian Public Administration. 35 (2), Summer 1992, p. 208. 
189 
190 Ibid., p. 203. 
Ibid., pp. 194-214. 
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told" environment, support from the top, a tolerance of risk-taking, training and 
facilitation are needed in order for teams to function efficiently. As with most 
organizations, the CDSSAB named teams, but as yet, has not invested enough financial 
and human resources to make their teams effective. With more services to be assumed 
in the future and as the organization becomes more complex, empowered teams will be 
vital to achieving provincial long-term goals. 
The assumption of Land Ambulance is scheduled for transition to the CDSSAB on or 
before January 1,2001. CDSSAB Board Resolution 99-88 commits the Board to assume 
the services and ensure their provision in accordance with fundamental principles 
including, "service will be accessible, integrated, seamless accountable and 
responsive."191 There is also commitment to having a performance-based system 
providing quality and cost effectiveness. This will be achieved by implementing a 
system with predefined standards of care and response times that are monitored and 
measured to ensure accountability.192 A commitment is also given to "clinical 
excellence, response time reliability, economic efficiency and client satisfaction"193. 
There is also a commitment to recognizing the important human resource component of 
paramedics and the provision of a working environment "conducive to professional 
career development and employee stability."194 
191 Steve Triner, "Emergency Medical Services System Overview," Report to District of Cochrane Social 
Service Administration Board, December 16,1999, p.2. 
192 Ibid., p. 3. 
l9JIbid.,p.3. 
194 Ibid., p. 3. 
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Although land ambulance management will be assumed by January 1,1001, the date for 
devolution of social housing responsibilities has not yet been determined. In a 
discussion paper on the amalgamation of the three housing authorities in the Cochrane 
District195, Joe Torlone, CAO, CD5SAB, suggests economies of scale to be achieved by 
consolidation, but acknowledges the current fiscal constraints and the difficulties small 
organizations will have in providing the necessary products and services. He is 
adamant that "further analysis must be undertaken to accurately determine if cost 
efficiencies will occur."196 The proposal consolidates the functions of governance, 
finance, human resources administration, technical services, purchasing and 
information technology in order to reduce duplication and share expertise. Property 
management services would still be offered in smaller localized modules to ensure 
personal services would be maintained and there would be resources available at the 
community level. The proposed governance would consist of a transition board 
consisting of members from each of the present housing authorities, members of the 
CDSSAB Social Housing Committee, the current Housing Authority Manager and the 
CDSSAB CAO. After the devolution process is complete, the responsibility would shift 
to the CDSSAB Board. The benefits proposed include: 
• a local solution, 
• the retention of existing staff from the housing authorities, as a component of the 
CDSSAB, with attrition being utilized for downsizing expected from consolidation 
of administrative functions, 
• a modular solution with client services remaining at the community level, 
195 Joseph Torlone, "Amalgamation of the Cochrane District's Three Local Housing Authorities," Report to 
District of Cochrane Social Service Administration Board, February 25,2000, pp. 1-13. 
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/a***- • a reduction in duplication and, 
• equity of standards across the district. 
There is the intent of hiring a professional housing manager. 
One objective of this paper was to discover the main objectives of the forced 
consolidation of the District of Cochrane Social Services Administration Board. A 
second objective was the analysis of whether the CDSSAB, in its first year of operation, 
has met the short-term provincial objectives. The conclusion also addresses whether the 
CDSSAB has the organizational capacity to meet the long-term provincial goals. 
Was the CDSSAB established, as stated by the province because the "Status quo is 
wasteful and inefficient/'197 or was the establishment motivated by the provincial 
decision to download the management and delivery of many services to municipalities. 
Once the decision to download services was made, the province required a mechanism 
in the North for management and delivery of these services over a large geographic 
area. The provincial desire to create an organization that would utilize new public 
management theories to develop the ability to deliver effective, integrated human 
services across the District's vast geographical area was foremost. The Common Sense 
Revolution had committed the government to reduce the size of the public service. That 
also motivated the provincial government to reduce direct delivery of services and the 
number of agencies with which it had to deal, thereby reducing the amount of 
administration done by the public service in Ontario. 
/"^ ™ Ibid, p. 8 
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Efficiency, although referred to often, is discovered to be a long-term goal, not 
necessarily expected in the short-term. This paper has shown that the short-term 
provincial motivation was not efficiency, but the creation of organizations that had the 
organizational capacity to deliver downloaded services, and the desire to downsize the 
Ontario Public Service. 
The formation of the CDSSAB, another special purpose body for Northern Ontario, and 
regional delivery of services seemed to fly in the face of the new provincial policy of 
reducing government by eliminating upper tier bodies, as evidenced by amalgamations 
in Southern Ontario. Because it was not practical to amalgamate the vast, sparsely 
^^^ populated areas of Northern Ontario into one city, the province needed another 
mechanism to ensure they would be able to download services. In Northern Ontario, 
they solved the problem using new public management theories. They would create 
new regional bodies with the organizational capacity to handle the alternative service 
delivery. The CDSSAB is one of these organizations. The plan to reduce government in 
the North is still on the agenda even with the creation of a new special purpose body, 
albeit in a different manner than in the south. 
The organization has achieved the provincial short-term goals of organizational capacity 
and effectiveness and the reduction of the Ontario Public Service. The CDSSAB has met 
the province's challenge to be an effective, client centered, responsive, integrated service 
197 Suzanne Herbert, Assistant Deputy Minister, "Remarks to the Fall Training Seminar of the Ontario 
Municipal Social Services Association, Ministry of Community and Social Services, November 30,1998 
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/»p«v delivery organization, by utilizing new public management theories. They have the 
technical and management expertise to deliver the wide range of services. They are a 
responsive organization, with the ability to change and adapt. They are an effective, 
accountable organization capable of meeting funding-based result targets. 
Further, future research will be needed to determine if the province's long-term goal of 
efficiency will be achieved. 
The CDSSAB is an organization that has met the province's short-term objectives and, 
although still facing many challenges, is positioned to meet the long-term objectives of 
the province. The long-term provincial goals are multi-faceted. As the literature 
indicates, they want efficiencies, less government and superior integrated services. 
^^ Efficiency is emphasized in a August 21,1997 News Release from Janet Ecker regarding 
the Who Does What reforms states the changes will "provide better services at lower 
cost to the taxpayers." Outcome measurement will be critical in determining both the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the organization. The CDSSAB has proven that it has the 
capability to determine and monitor targets for new results-based funding model. Other 
documentation describes the government's goals in a different perspective. In the 
Ontario Government Business Plans -1998-1999 more focus is being placed on customer 
service "Making Services Work for People"198 is described as, "The aim of this multi-
year initiative to restructure social services to better meet people's needs."199 Creating 
efficiency is still mentioned but priority is given to reducing overlap and frustration for 
client and providing services that are easier to find and more effective. 
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Efficiencies are expected at the completion of the downloading. Once devolution is 
complete CDSSAB will have replaced the CDWAB, three Local Housing Authority 
Boards and one Public Health Board. The province will have one administration to deal 
with instead of the multiple municipalities and agencies with whom they contracted 
service delivery of Ontario Works, childcare and land ambulance. The province will 
also have eliminated direct service delivery to the unincorporated areas of the district. 
This meets objectives of downsizing government, downsizing public service, and 
provides an effective organizational structure with the capacity to deliver integrated 
downloaded services. The CDSSAB Vision Statement should guide the organization in 
making future decisions to enhance effectiveness and meet the provincial goals of 
improved integrated service for the citizens of the District of Cochrane. If the CDSSAB 
remains committed to new public management theories, maintaining a responsive, well 
focused, managerial adept organization, the researcher believes they will be prepared 
for the challenges ahead. 
The CDSSAB, in its first year, achieved the organizational effectiveness desired by the 
province in the short-term. It has the organizational capacity to continue to meet the 
provincial objectives of effective, responsive, integrated human service delivery. The 
province has also succeeded in reducing the size of the public service, in the Cochrane 
District. Whether the provincial desire for long-term efficiencies will be realized would 
198 Government of Ontario, Ministry of Community and Social Services, "Ontario Government Business 
Plans," p. 11. Internet at http://www.gov.on.ca/MBS/englisWpress/plans98/css.html accessed Dec. 30, 
1998. 
199 Ibid., p. 2. 
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if be an interesting topic for further research. In any case, such efficiencies cannot be 
determined until several years have passed. 
APPENDIX "A' 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
INTERVIEW WITH GERMAIN LACOURSIERE, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, 
NORTHEAST AREA OFFICE, MINISTRY OF COMMUNITY AND SOCIAL SERVICES 
INTERVIEW CONDUCTED - JULY 10,2000 
What prompted the Provincial Government's decision to consolidate the management 
and delivery of social services? 
What were the factors considered in the decision on the number of Consolidated 
Municipal Service Managers? 
Were there any special considerations around the geographic size of the delivery agents 
in Northern Ontario? 
How was the final decision arrived at regarding the number of DSSABs for Northern 
Ontario? 
What were the expectations for administrative efficiency and service delivery 
effectiveness, both short and long term? 
Has the first year achieved the desired results? 
Are there expectations of further efficiencies as the DSSABs mature, assume more 
services and fulfill their purpose of integrated delivery agents? 
APPENDIX "B' Ontario 
APPENDIX "C 
MAP ILLUSTRATING THE DISTRIBUTION OF COMMUNITIES 




District of Cochrane Social Services 
Administration Board 
Vision and Values 
/J| 
Our Vision is... 
[To further develop a District service environment that is 
?sponsive to community needs and which values the 
\ndividuality of its residents. 
\}Ve will achieve this by: 
demonstrating respect for clients, staff and 
zommunity partners. We will treat each person, as 
;e would like to be treated. 
Communicating effectively with clients, staff and 
community partners. 
Encouraging professional development and 
individual and team growth. 
Bringing together the interests of all to achieve 
our common purpose. 
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